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Under President Putin, Russia’s foreign policy adopted the characteristics of 
Great Power Normalization, a pragmatic, economically focused model described by 
Andrei Tsygankov.  Its tenets include cooperative economic and security relationships 
with the West, to include tolerance of Western military presence in the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU); a refocused foreign policy toward the FSU designed to secure regional 
hegemony; and a de-emphasis of large-scale integration efforts such as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in lieu of bilateral and regionally focused 
multilateral efforts that elevate geo-economic goals over military presence.  Russian 
foreign policy during President Putin’s second term of office however, appears to have 
become more assertive, characterized by increasing conflict with CIS member Georgia, 
renewed military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin at the expense of 
Western presence, and an aggressive energy agenda that has secured Russia large stakes 
in FSU energy infrastructure and a monopoly on regional oil and gas pipelines that export 
raw materials to outside markets.   This thesis analyzed Russian influence in diplomatic, 
cultural, economic and military efforts across two regions, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, to determine whether Russia is merely pursuing regional hegemony or establishing 
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A. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
On 2 February 2006, U.S. National Intelligence Director John Negroponte 
provided the Senate Intelligence Committee his annual Threat Assessment.  While the 
bulk of the document focuses on the global Islamic Jihadist threat, Negroponte also 
outlined developments in several traditional states deemed to be of greatest concern to the 
United States, among them Russia. Negroponte testified that:   
Russia could become a more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for 
the United States over the next several years. High profits from exports of 
oil and gas and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have 
bolstered Moscow’s confidence… [G]rowing suspicions about Western 
intentions and Moscow’s desire to demonstrate its independence and 
defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on 
areas of concern to the United States.1 
In an open letter to the governments of NATO and the European Union (EU), a 
significant number of eminent Russia scholars, policy analysts and Euro-Atlantic political 
leaders observed the deteriorating nature of Russian democracy under President Putin.  In 
the area of foreign relations they remarked that “President Putin's foreign policy is 
increasingly marked by a threatening attitude towards Russia's neighbors and Europe's 
energy security, the return of rhetoric of militarism and empire, and by a refusal to 
comply with Russia's international treaty obligations.”2  Other scholars argue to the 
contrary: that Russian foreign policy has been accommodating to the West, despite being 
confronted with events such as NATO and EU expansion and U.S. military presence in 
its backyard, specifically Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  They argue that with 
instability arising from Islam extremists on its Southern flank and  
 
 
                                                 
1 Transcript of statement available online at Director of National Intelligence Homepage 
http://www.dni.gov/WWT%20Oral%20Statement%20UNCLASSIFIED%201%20February%20FINAL%2
0VERSION.pdf  (accessed February 2006). 
2 Urban Ahlin et al., An Open Letter to the Governments of NATO and the European Union dated 28 
September 2004.  The Brookings Institution.  http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/russia20040928.htm 
(accessed March 2006). 
2 
growing economic power of China to its East, Russia has little choice but to embrace the 
Euro-Atlantic community and commit to peaceful coexistence with the West, if not full 
integration.3   
Between these extremes lie foreign policy experts like Andrei Tsygankov, who 
maintain President Putin’s strategy, described as Great-Power Normalization, has 
resulted in foreign policy that is pragmatic, focused neither exclusively on Western 
integration, nor on renewed imperial ambitions and realpolitik attempts to balance against 
the West.  It is driven by economic imperatives, not the geopolitical ambitions or 
ideological roots that characterize Russia’s more nationalist or Eurasianist policy 
activists.  The Great Power Normalization agenda is supported domestically by a 
coalition of commercial and security interests, but is not dominated by military 
industrialists and security forces.  Its foreign policy goal is to maintain economic and 
security cooperation with the West while also becoming the dominant center of influence 
in former Soviet areas.  It is not preoccupied with perceptions of American unipolarity as 
Russia’s greatest threat, but it is also not seeking integration with the West or a pro-
Western foreign policy.   
This thesis examines the aspect of Tsygankov’s argument that deals with Russia’s 
relations with the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It will deal 
specifically with Moscow’s foreign policy toward its neighbors in two geographic 
regions: the Caucasus and Central Asia, both on the country’s strategic southern flank.  
On the one hand, Tsygankov argues that Putin’s approach differs from Russian 
Westernizers’ non-interference model that would allow former Soviet states to pursue 
their own path of development (even if it means integration in Western institutional 
structures such as NATO and the EU).  On the other hand, it stops short of reintegration 
or neo-imperialism; it eschews integration efforts that come at a high price, and focuses 
on a pragmatic course of bilateral relations and coalition building to combat regional 
terrorist threats.  Under this policy Russia seeks to reclaim its great power status through  
 
 
                                                 
3 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 
3 
economic revitalization. It would then once again become an attractive model and 
security partner to its post-Soviet neighbors and regain the dominant influence in the 
region that it lost in the 1990s.   
Three related research questions arise from consideration of Russia’s pursuit of 
influence in the former Soviet republics.   
First, what are the mechanisms Russia has used in its efforts to reestablish a 
presence in the former Soviet republics?  Second, how successful have Moscow’s efforts 
been?  Third, what motivates Russia’s policy in the former Soviet republics? Does it 
reflect the tenets of Great Power Normalization, Great Power Balancing, or Liberal 
Imperialism current among the Russian political elite? If motivated by Tsygankov’s 
Great Power Normalization, then Moscow is simply exercising its prerogative (as a 
regional Great Power) to be a dominant player in its own backyard (much as the United 
States did when it articulated the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary). Or is 
Russian policy driven by what Tsygankov describes as Great Power Balancers, who seek 
re-integration of the former Soviet areas and a formal re-creation of the Soviet empire?  
Tsygankov describes this type of imperialism as one where one country formally assumes 
control over another’s sovereignty through military force and subsequent colonial 
economic and social development (the Soviet model).  He argues that neither of these 
characteristics is evident in Russia’s current behavior.  While Moscow still intends to use 
“sticks and carrots” to extract support from the newly independent states, the sticks will 
no longer come in the form of brute force intended to subjugate another state, but 
“informal diplomatic influences and soft power.”4  Is Russian policy instead motivated 
by economic liberalism? Rather than a traditional, expansionist oriented empire, Russia is 
attempting to create a “liberal” empire, driven by mutually beneficial incentives, 
primarily economic.  Successful pursuit of these efforts requires that the influence of the 
West in this region, especially the United States, be limited as much as possible in order 
for Russia to preserve and build its own power and enhance its prestige and influence.”5 
                                                 
4 Andrei Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power,” Post Soviet 
Affairs 21, no. 2, (2005): 133. 
5 The reference to a “liberal” empire was made by Anatoly Chubais, head of Russia’s electricity 
monopoly, RAO UES during a press conference in September 2003 and will be discussed further in 
subsequent chapters. 
4 
The methodology used to answer these questions is a comparative case study of 
two regions: the Caucasus and Central Asia, with specific emphasis on Georgia and 
Uzbekistan.  These regions were selected because of their strategic importance to Russia.  
They lie on its vulnerable southern flank, a multi-ethnic patchwork of primarily Muslim 
regions in the Caucasus and permeable borders vulnerable to Islamic extremists and drug 
traffickers in Central Asia.  In addition, both regions border the energy-rich Caspian 
Basin.  Within the regions, Georgia and Uzbekistan were selected for emphasis because 
they both have attempted to distance themselves from Moscow since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. They have pursued largely independent foreign policies and agendas, and 
therefore provide a good litmus test for assessing Russian motives as well as how 
effective Russia’s attempts to re-exert its influence have been.  . 
B. THESIS FINDINGS 
The central question addressed is whether Russia’s efforts to establish a dominant 
influence in post Soviet spaces reflect the pragmatic nature of the policy described by 
Tsygankov or a more imperial ambition.   It should be noted that Tsygankov’s definition 
of imperialism relies on a model that seems to have become antiquated in a post Cold 
War era, where national sovereignty is the defining tenet of global affairs.  Historically, 
imperialism was the direct territorial conquest or settlement of another country, or the 
indirect exercise of control through the politics and/or economy of other countries.  This 
is the role Moscow played during the Cold War, direct territorial conquest with respect to 
its “inner” empire and indirect political and economic control of its “outer” empire 
through the Communist Party.  It is highly unlikely that imperialism based on this 
definition would arise again anywhere on the globe.  Instead, one must look at more 
modern manifestations of imperialism, frequently referred to as neo-imperialism, where a 
strong country trades territorial and political domination for economic domination and 
diplomatic influence; in other words, major powers using economic and political means 
to perpetuate or extend their influence over weaker states. 6   
Using Tsygankov’s models and definitions, this thesis largely reveals that Russian 
behavior does most closely resemble Great-Power Normalization – the pragmatic, 
                                                 
6 These types of relationships are examined closely in Dependency Theory, a model of international 
relations usually applied to study of relationships between modern nations and the poor states of Africa. 
5 
economic oriented approach to projecting influence -- versus an anti-Western balancing 
approach, integration, and a military emphasis in projecting influence.  Despite an 
extensive increase in Moscow’s ability and willingness to influence regional issues and 
dominate the regional agenda, Russian actions had not yet in 2006 alienated the West nor 
set up a new Great Game.  On the contrary, both the U.S. and Europe appeared far more 
occupied in 2006 with Russia’s domestic political issues -- its stalled path toward 
democracy -- than its foreign policy agenda in its “near abroad.”  The U.S. National 
Security Strategy 2006 document cited Russia as a partner in global security issues 
related to counterterrorism and nonproliferation, especially in regard to Iran and the 
DPRK.  It further recognized that due to its geography and power “Russia has great 
influence not only in Europe and its own immediate neighborhood, but also in many 
other regions of vital interest to us: the broader Middle East, South and Central Asia, and 
East Asia.”7   
Economic cooperation with the West, another key component of Putin’s 
pragmatic foreign policy approach, was also not impaired by Russian policy in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus.  In fact, foreign investment in Russia continued to increase 8 and 
Moscow embarked on several large scale cooperative energy projects with EU and/or 
NATO countries, specifically the Northern European and the Blue Stream gas pipelines.   
Russia felt confident enough in its international position to play a major role in global 
affairs, taking an independent position on issues such as Iranian nuclear proliferation and 
diplomatic relations with Hamas.  Both issues showcased Moscow as an important 
interlocutor for the West, taking a middle ground that did not parrot the Euro-Atlantic 
position but did not undermine it either.   
Where Tsygankov’s approach falls short however, is in addressing the impact of 
Russia’s economic offensive on its neighbors.  While Russia has every right to normalize 
                                                 
7 National Security Strategy Report 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf 
(accessed March 2006).  
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report Global Investment 
Prospects Assessment 2005-2008.  Half of the top 10 countries ranked by experts and transnational 
corporations were from the developing world. China was considered the most attractive with the other top 
five being the US, India, the Russian Federation and Brazil, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templateswebflyer.asp?docid=6301&intItemID=1528&lang=1 (accessed March 
2006) 
6 
its energy relationships with CIS neighbors and stop subsidizing their gas, oil and 
electricity consumption, its increasing stranglehold on regional energy infrastructure in 
the early twenty-first century began to border on neo-imperialism, the ability to exert 
control over another country using economic power.   Tsygankov’s criteria does not 
sufficiently address this phenomenon because it focuses on political reintegration through 
mechanisms such as the CIS and uses an anti-Western agenda as the sole measure of 
whether Russia has moved beyond pragmatic Great Power normalization.   The line 
between these two arenas is far more nuanced and merits closer examination.  Analysis of 
the case studies will enable the reader to judge better whether or not Russia has crossed 
this boundary.  While the difference between exerting “normal” Great Power influence 
and imperial domination may be a fine line (especially for those in backyard who may 
not perceive a difference at all), for the West, which strongly supports unhampered 
democratic development in the FSU, it is an important distinction.  Moscow’s efforts 
have met with somewhat mixed success.  While President Putin’s administration has been 
characterized by a renewed attention to its “near abroad,” pro-West popular revolutions 
in Georgia and Ukraine led many Russian experts to consider 2004 a low point in 
Russian foreign policy, a repudiation of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet 
republics.9  Russia’s diplomatic rhetoric at the time concerning the CIS was appropriately 
evenhanded.  President Putin told a conference of Russian ambassadors in July 2004 that 
Russia did not have a monopoly on the CIS.   Foreign Minister Lavrov elaborated further, 
explaining that CIS states enjoyed “the sovereign right to build their foreign policies in 
accordance with their own national interests. This is the reason why no other state or 
group of states can lay claims to monopoly influence. Any attempt to place the CIS 
countries in a false dilemma (“either with the West, or with Russia”) would be unnatural, 
dangerous and irresponsible. No one would gain from a revival of obsolete methods of 
geopolitical rivalry.”10    
                                                 
9 Newspaper interview with Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the presidium of the Foreign and Defense 
Policy Council.  Yulia Petrovskaya, “Take Care Not to Repeat the Same Mistake - Russia Can Replace 
Regimes, but Cannot Offer an Attractive Model.  A Review of Russia's Foreign Policy Performance in 
2004,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta – Dipkurier, No. 16 (79), December 2004. 
10 Lavrov, Sergei, “Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order,” Russia in 
Global Affairs, (January - March 2005), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/818.html (accessed 
February 2006). 
7 
Throughout 2005 however, as the U.S. struggled with the insurgency in Iraq and 
natural disasters at home, and the confidence of the EU was shaken by failures to ratify 
its new constitution, Russia’s international stock was rising.  Despite cooperation with the 
United States on issues ranging from counterterrorism to counter proliferation, and public 
declarations to the contrary, Moscow continued to view foreign influence in these spaces 
as a zero sum game: American presence was viewed as a painful concession, with other 
countries filling a vacuum left by Russian retreat.11   Moscow’s relationship with 
westward-leaning Georgia grew increasingly tense in 2005, characterized by energy 
disputes and controversy over Russian peacekeepers.  Having successfully lobbied in 
2005 for closure of Russian bases left over from the Soviet era, Tbilisi then attempted to 
secure the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from its two secessionist regions and 
draw increased international visibility to the frozen conflicts.  At the same time however, 
Moscow appeared to have rebounded and reasserted itself in Central Asia, particularly in 
historically neutral Uzbekistan.  In 2005, working through the SCO, Moscow helped 
orchestrate the eviction of U.S. military forces from Karshi-Kanabad (K2) Airbase in 
Uzbekistan.  Shortly thereafter, Moscow entered into a historic mutual defense pact with 
Uzbekistan, a country that has held Russia at arms length and was a strategic partner in 
the U.S.-led “Global War on Terrorism.”  Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian state to 
participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and has held joint exercises with US and 
NATO troops.  In 1999 President Karimov pulled out of the CIS collective security pact 
and joined the pro-Western GUAM organization (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova).  In March 2002 President Karimov signed the Uzbek-American Declaration 
on Strategic Partnership which pledged economic, military, political and cultural 
cooperation.  The US emphasized pursuit of democratic values and institutions, in 
addition to security, and accompanied the pact with a $160M aid package to support 
internal reforms.12      
 
 
                                                 
11 Zagorski, Andrei, “Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood,” Chaillot Paper #74 (January 2005), 69. 
12 Government of Uzbekistan Homepage.  http://2004.press-
service.uz/eng/pressa_eng/pressa_eng8.htm and US Department of State Homepage. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736.htm (accessed  February 2006). 
8 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Russia’s available levers of power in the region and the identification of its most 
(and least) effective means in advancing its foreign policy goals.  This is done through a 
Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) construct, a format frequently 
used by the United States military.  It examines areas of national power that are leveraged 
in “effects-based” operations against an adversary's vulnerabilities.  This model, 
traditionally used by information operators to assist combatant commands, attempts to 
outline the full range of DIME actions that a state can use to achieve specific effects on 
an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives.13  Within each case 
study, this thesis first examines the information realm, specifically the impact of Russia’s 
cultural influence in the region.  Second, in the diplomatic realm focuses on key Kremlin 
political initiatives, such as regional integration and efforts to maintain the political status 
quo of authoritarian regimes in the CIS, as well as efforts to exploit the internal instability 
of others to maximize Moscow’s influence.  Third, a look at economic mechanisms, the 
most significant of which is an aggressive energy agenda, reveals how Russia has focused 
upon its comparative advantage -- its natural resources -- to gain leverage in its 
relationships with CIS members.  Finally, each case study closes with examination of 
military and security mechanisms such as regional threat-protection efforts.  Analysis of 
all these factors reveals Russia has been extremely active in waging a multi-dimensional 
geopolitical offensive to restore its influence throughout much of the CIS, with its 
greatest success taking place in Central Asia.    
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Chapter II: Theoretical Framework and Background  
This chapter provides a literature review and explains three primary schools of 
Russian thought regarding foreign policy: Integrationists, Great Power Normalizers and 
Great Power Balancers. 14  It discusses the history of the CIS organization and why it 
does not serve as a useful tool for Russian integration efforts.  Finally, it provides 
background on several key issues that affect Russian foreign policy, to include: 
 
                                                 
13 U.S. Joint Forces Command Glossary.  DIME and Operational Net Assessment (ONA) definitions 
available online at  http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm (accessed January 2006). 
14 Tsygankov. 2005 
9 
• Impact of “color” revolutions 
• Significant economic issues  
• Significant security issues 
2. Chapter III: Caucasus Case Study 
This chapter will cover the Caucasus and identify major Russian policy efforts 
using the DIME construct (diplomacy, information, military and economy).   Issues that 
will dominate this section are regional security with regard to terrorism and organized 
crime, Chechnya, and the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Georgia, as well as 
economic issues related specifically to the Caspian oil reserves and access to 
transshipment pipelines. 
3. Chapter IV: Central Asia Case Study 
This chapter will cover Central Asia and identify major policy efforts also using 
the DIME construct.  Issues of regional security, especially as it relates to Islamic 
extremism, as well as basing of both Russian and Western troops dominate this chapter.  
However, it will also discuss regional security and economic cooperation through efforts 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
4. Chapter V: Conclusion 
The final chapter reviews the mechanisms that have reinvigorated Russia’s 
influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus and analyzes whether the key economic, 
political and military initiatives in select former-Soviet countries in the past two years 
support the thesis of Russia’s Great-Power Normalization or arguments suggesting 
Russian policy is above all aimed at balancing the United States, with corresponding 
significance for US-Russia relations.   The DIME construct reveals the relatives strengths 
of the different mechanisms of influence within each region, making it easier for Western 
policy makers to devise appropriate strategies for countering or cooperating with Russian 
interests and addressing the implications for U.S. policy interests when competing with 
Russia for influence in the former Soviet republics.   
The overall conclusion drawn here is that while Russian foreign policy in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia may appear confrontational to outside observers, overall it 
reflects Tsygankov’s model of a new pragmatic approach to foreign policy and does not 
appear to be characterized by a return to the anti-American balancing approach.  
10 
Nonetheless, Moscow’s relations with the CIS leave cause for concern which 
Tsygankov’s model does not adequately address.  Moscow, as a regional hegemon, has a 
natural role to play in the former Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia.  However, 
that role should not consist of military intervention, political subversion and economic 
colonialism however.  Russia possesses a cultural advantage in the CIS (more so in 
Central Asia than the Caucasus) that makes it a more attractive economic and strategic 
partner to its neighbors.  In addition, due to geographic proximity, it shares more 
intensely the security concerns of the region than the West ever could.  These are 
comparative advantages that should allow Russia to be the dominant influence in its 
backyard, leading by the strength of its economy and its political relationships.  When 
Russia oversteps this boundary, and attempts to subvert the interests of its neighbors, or 
subordinate their interests to its own, it risks repudiation and a backlash of the sort that 
spawns colored revolutions.     
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework used in this thesis and provides 
the historical background and context that enables readers who may be unfamiliar with 
the study of Russia to better interpret the motivations behind Russian foreign policy 
efforts.  The first two sections consist of a literature review which focuses on a key issue 
in Russian discourse, the search for identify.  It also explains three primary schools of 
Russian thought regarding foreign policy and how they fit into Tsygankov’s model.  The 
third section provides an overview of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
organization and why it does not serve as an adequate vehicle for implementing President 
Putin’s foreign policy efforts in the former Soviet republics and prompting the need to 
closer bilateral and sub-regional ties as called for in the Great Power Normalizer model.  
The fourth sections provide the reader background on several key issues that impact 
Russia foreign policy: the impact of the recent Color Revolutions on Russia; the large 
role that economic development has taken in Russia’s foreign policy agenda, especially 
its emphasis on energy; and a synopsis of Russia’s security concerns relative to its 
Southern flank. 
A. PART ONE - LITERATURE REVIEW 
A common theme that emerges in literature on Russian foreign policy is that it is 
hindered by the country’s struggle for national identity.  Throughout its centuries long 
history, Russia can not seem to consistently decide whether it wants to be European or 
something uniquely different; whether it wants to embrace the West or stand as an 
opposing pole in a multipolar international system.  This identity crisis creates significant 
philosophical space for domestic debate and room for geopolitical maneuver and in post-
Soviet Russia manifests itself in the political debates between Westernizers (also known 
as Integrationists or Atlanticists) at one end of the spectrum and Realists (also known as 
Balancers) at the other.  While other fringe movements in Russian foreign policy thinking 
exist, Russian scholar Andrei Tsygankov points out that “the competition in the 
mainstream national discourse has become a contest fought out among the Integrationists, 
the great power Balancers and great power Normalizers (a middle ground between the 
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two). 15   What they all have in common is the struggle to define an issue that occupies 
scholars of Russian foreign policy (and the minds of ordinary Russians themselves): what 
is the nation’s role with respect to the West.  Are Russians a part of Europe or not a part 
of Europe?  Does Europe want to embrace Russia as one of its own and does Russia want 
to be embraced in turn?   
The West has had a significant impact on Russia for centuries.  Europe served as 
the model to rulers such as Peter the Great who sought to modernize his empire 
politically, economically and culturally and laid the foundation that allowed Russia to 
become a continental Great Power at the turn of the 18th century.  James Billington, in his 
book Russia in Search of Itself, writes about the country’s historical struggle to find its 
comfort level with regard to Western influence, sparking debate between Westernizers 
like Catherine the Great and Slavophiles, who attributed Russia’ s greatness to its Slavic 
roots, Orthodoxy, communal institutions and its rural nature, not a shared modernizing 
European culture.16   
In modern discourse the nature of Russia’s love-hate relationship with Europe is 
often characterized by Moscow’s feeling that Europe does not appreciate all the sacrifices 
it has made and how many times it has been a martyr to Europe’s greater good.  Russians 
contend that it was their vast landmass served as the buffer zone, keeping the Mongol 
hordes at bay during the 13th century, while it subjugated its people to the Tatar yoke for 
over 200 years.  It was the Russian army that defeated Napoleon in 1814, preserving the 
“pluralism of countries and peoples of Europe at the cost of absolutism in Russia.” 17  In 
defense of its European Slav brothers, Russia suffered a painful defeat that plunged the 
country into civil war and spawned the Bolshevik revolution.  Finally, Russia made 
tremendous human and material sacrifices in defeating Hitler’s Germany and freeing 
Europe once again from tyranny.   In turn, the fall of communism largely portrayed 
                                                 
15 Andrei Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power,” Post Soviet 
Affairs 21, no. 2, (2005): 136-137.  Tsygankov recognizes more hard-line factions, such as ultra nationalists 
and neo-imperialists that seek to reform the Soviet Union but argues that these have been marginalized in 
modern politics. 
16 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
2004), 12-15. 
17 Margot Light, “In Search of an Identify: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology,” in 
Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies, ed. Rick Fawn (Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2004) 54-55. 
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Russia as the vanquished party in the Cold War, versus recognizing it as “the side that 
simply ceased to play the Cold War game.” 18  Much to their disappointment, the fall of 
the Soviet Union did not result in Europe’s collective embrace of its Eastern cousin, but 
rather continued suspicion of its motives and fear of revanchism, evidenced by two 
rounds of NATO expansion and marginalization of Russia throughout the Kosovo 
conflict.  These disappointments have served to discredit the liberal Russian 
establishment and its Integrationist agenda.   Balancers on the other hand have capitalized 
on the country’s nagging feeling that Russia will never be accepted as an equal among 
the Europeans, a sentiment that keeps fanning the flames of other ideological orientations 
that counter Western integration. 
The horrors of World War I and its disastrous aftermath for Russia led to an 
intellectual repudiation of the West and the formalization of the Eurasianist movement in 
the early 1920s by Russian émigrés.  It called for Russia to forgo the trappings of 
overseas colonial empires like those of its French and British peers, and instead look 
inward and embrace its own “continental ocean” with its vast diversity of resources and 
riches. 19  Eurasianism touts Russia’s uniqueness as neither European nor Asian, but a 
distinct blend of the two and therefore calls for the country to pursue a different path, 
apart from both.  It differs from ultra-nationalism however in that it embraces all of the 
different ethnic groups of the Russian landmass, as opposed to espousing a strict 
ethnically Russian chauvinism.   Eurasianists would even argue that Mongol rule, rather 
than being the cause of Russia’s “slow-learning” and “late entry into a common European 
home” gave Russia its culture of strong, authoritarian rule, which allowed the unification 
of “quarreling principalities of medieval Russia and for building a land empire that Great 
Russia could grow to dominate.” 20   
In post-Soviet Russia, a more modern Eurasianist thinking was revived in 
response to the “Atlanticists” who were perceived to be pushing NATO membership into 
                                                 
18 Light. 
19 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “Asia through Russian Eyes,” in Russia and Asia, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 3-29. 
20 Billington, 71. 
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the heartland of the traditional Russian empire.21   Disenchantment and frustration over 
stalled Western styled economic reforms, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, criticism of 
Russia’s operations in Chechnya and U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty all led to questioning of whether Russia really belonged in the Euro-Atlantic 
community.  While 9/11 provided the prospect of a newfound cohesion between Russia 
and the West, it proved short-lived following the Bush administration’s new global 
agenda of promoting democratization, especially in the former Soviet republics.  
Elements of this thinking have continued to color Moscow’s perception of its role relative 
to other global powers, underpinning its belief that while Russia may no longer possess 
the formidable conventional military power of the Soviet era, it can and should exert 
geopolitical influence and diplomatic presence in Eurasia, a mandate that can not be 
discounted by the United States and Europe.   
Respected scholar of Russian politics, Dmitri Trenin, argues that Eurasianism is a 
dead end for Russia, and that foreign policy has to “proceed from Russia’s needs, not its 
elites’ historical ambitions.  Taking on the West, even in a token fashion, is detrimental to 
national interests.”22  Furthermore, he argues that the political instability of Russia’s 
Muslim dominated southern flank, the rising regional influence of Iran and the growing 
economic power of China to the east, leaves Russia no option but to integrate with 
Europe and form an alliance with the United States.  In order to balance against these 
forces, he sees Russia's geopolitical future lying with the West, and he predicts a retreat 
from Russia’s perceptions of its unique Eurasian character toward a more liberal western 
tradition.23  Other Integrationists like Sergei Kortunov argue that the “pragmatism of 
President Putin’s course is only designed to cover up the obvious fact that the country’s 
foreign policy is sporadic and based on a response-to-emergency formula.” 24  In order to 
advance in a postindustrial society, he argues Russia must align its foreign policy “toward 
those states that have already embraced an innovative development model…as well as 
                                                 
21 Billington, 72. 
22 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy Under Putin,” (Carnegie Endowment, 2005) 
23 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 
24 Sergei Kortunov, “Invigorating Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs 4: October-
December 2005. 
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countries sharing the same culture and other values, with Russia.  These are primarily 
countries of Western Europe and the United States.”25 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia once again had to make a fundamental 
choice about its future.  Would it embrace the West, like Peter the Great two centuries 
before, and reconcile with its European roots, or would it continue to stand apart and 
attempt to regain its Great Power status, refashioning itself as the heir to the Soviet 
legacy-- a global balancer to the West.  While the Westernizer approach which was so 
discredited in the late 1990s seemed to be revived after 9/11, the tide appears to have 
turned back once again.  In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in April 2005, 
President Putin stressed that “the civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian 
continent should continue,” implying that Russia’s presence in the former Soviet 
republics will not wane, and heartening his Eurasianist constituency.  It should be noted 
however that in the same speech, he also stated: “We are a major European nation; we 
have always been an integral part of Europe and share all its values and the ideals of 
freedom and democracy. But we will carry out this process ourselves, taking into account 
all our specific characteristics, and do not intend to report to anyone on the progress we 
make.”  This dualistic approach is described by one analyst as “Western-oriented but 
Western-wary.” 26  It also allows Putin to play to different audiences and constituencies.   
He uses the “philosophical trappings of Eurasianism,” to shore up domestic support by 
echoing “the anti-American and ant globalization ethos of the Eurasianists” and 
reminding the world that neither Europe nor the U.S. have a patent on democracy.27  On 
the other track, he champions integration with the economies of the Euro-Atlantic West, 
ensuring a satisfactory bottom line for Russia’s business elites.  While Eurasianism may 
be a dead end for Russia, the West should be prepared for it to periodically dominate its 
dialogue with Moscow.  Leaders like Putin will “continue to use it as a mantle because  
 
 
                                                 
25 Sergei Kortunov, “Invigorating Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs 4: October-
December 2005.Ibid 
26 Matthew Schmidt, “Is Russia Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism,” Demokratizatsiya, 13, no. 1 
(Winter 2005). 
27 Schmidt, 93. 
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they don’t know where Russia’s rightful place is.  This means that inevitably Russia will 
go through periods of isolation, lack of modernization and confrontation with the 
West.”28 
B. PART TWO – TSYGANKOV’S MODEL 
Tsygankov captures these disparate views on Russia’s international strategy and 
formulates a model that compares the positions of the Integrationists, Normalizers and 
Balancers across three elements: state concentration, cooperation with the West, and 
projection of influence in the former Soviet republics.   Tsygankov claims that Putin has 
adopted a foreign policy that occupies the middle ground, between Integrationists and 
Balancers, a pragmatic approach he terms Great Power Normalization, that seeks to 
maximize the benefits of both other approaches.  This thesis analyzes the third element, 
Russian influence in its “near abroad,” by focusing on two regions, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia and, and determining whether Moscow’s efforts align with Putin’s 
Normalizer approach.  The time frame of the analysis is the period  2003-2006 and 
reflects Russian response to key events such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the colored 
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, significant developments frequently 
cited for the break down of the post 9/11 relationship between Russia and the West.   
 Integrationists Great-Power Normalizers 
Great-Power 
Balancers 




















cooperation with the 
West; Dominant 
influence in the 




outside the US; Re-
integration of the 
former Soviet area 
Supportive 
Coalitions 
Commercial elites and 
liberal media 
















Table 1. Russia: Three Schools of Thought and their Grand Strategies (From Ref. 15). 
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28 Schmidt, 92. 
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Table 1 categorizes the key components of Tsygankov’s model and explains how 
the different schools manifest themselves across different elements.  Integrationists 
emphasize Russia’s similarities with the West and believe that shared values such human 
rights, democracy and market economy will create a “natural partnership”. 29  Balancers 
see Russia as distinct from the West, motivated by its own Great Power interests that may 
conflict with those of the West.  They view the international system from a realist 
perspective and seek to mold Russia into an “independent power in a multi-polar world,” 
a counter-balance to the West, not a part of it.30  Supporters of this approach, such as the 
military and security forces, argue that Moscow should enter into alliances with non-
Western states such as China and India, modernize its economic infrastructure and 
strengthen “its ability to organize and control the post-Soviet space.”31  Tsygankov 
argues that under President Putin, Russian foreign policy has been one of Great Power 
Normalization which seeks a pragmatic middle road between the extremes of the 
Integrationists and the Balancers.  In relations with the CIS, this approach argues that CIS 
integration is too costly, has generally not been successful and does not yield any benefits 
to Moscow. While Normalizers and Balancers share the vision of Moscow’s dominant 
influence in post Soviet spaces, they disagree about the means for achieving this end, as 
well as in their characterization of what constitutes a threat to Russia.  Unlike the 
balancers, pragmatists like President Putin see the key threat coming “not from the 
United States, bur from falling behind in economic development.”32  
In order to analyze Russia’s attempt to become the dominant influence in former 
Soviet areas, we make use of the DIME construct discussed in Chapter I to capture key 
diplomatic, information (culture), military and economic initiatives.  These are compared 
against Tsygankov’s observation that Putin’s Great-Power Normalizer approach seeks to 
make Russia the dominant influence in the former area without appearing anti-Western 
and jeopardizing the economic and security ties that have developed between Russia and 
the West, which would reflect a Balancer approach.  According to Tsygankov, with 
                                                 
29 Tsygankov, 2005. 
30 Tsygankov, 2005. 
31 Tsygankov, 2005. 
32 Tsygankov, 2005, 138. 
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respect to increasing influence in the former Soviet areas, Great-Power Normalizers 
differ from Balancers three significant ways:  
• The CIS organization is no longer used as vehicle for reintegration; 
instead Putin has replaced it with “more flexible, issues-based coalitions” 
with informal mechanisms and bilateral negotiations of interests 
• Russia welcomed limited military Western presence in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus 
• Geo-economic interests took precedence over geopolitical interests 
What Tsygankov is implying is that while Normalizers do not abandon security 
related mechanisms, they prefer to work with economic ones.  For example, while 
maintaining bases in its backyard is still a feature of this new brand of Russian foreign 
policy, it is not for the purpose of seizing territorial control (the small size of Russia’s 
deployed forces is a testament to that.)  Instead, it is intended to facilitate political and 
security related initiatives that Moscow is pursuing with its neighbors, such as regional 
stability, counterterrorism and border security.  The effort is defensive, in that its intent is 
to protect Russia from regional and domestic instability (for example not providing 
Chechen rebels a permissive environment in Russia’s southern flank from which to 
launch raids into Russia proper.)  Nor are full scale multilateral organizations such as the 
CIS being revitalized in an effort to expand Moscow’s authority over the former Soviet 
republics economically or politically; in fact the CIS has all but expired as a meaningful 
international entity, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  In its place, Tsygankov 
argues, are a series of bilateral agreements, or “coalitions of the willing” formed around 
synergistic interests and means, both political and economic.  The foundation of these 
however, are to be mutual interests and market incentives targeted at improving Russia’s 
9and hopefully its partners’) internal economic development.   
One shortcoming of Tsygankov’s model however is that he limits his definition of 
revived imperialism, as advocated by the Balancers, to political reintegration through 
political mechanisms such as the CIS, military expansion and consistent articulation of an 
anti-Western international agenda.   His model does not account for more modern neo-
imperial efforts such as economic domination and exploitation of a less powerful country.  
Analysis of these efforts, especially as they pertain to the energy sector, will be noted 
during the case studies and discussed further in the Conclusion. 
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C. PART THREE – A DIVIDED COMMONWEALTH  
Although initially envisioned as a “neo-Soviet project,”33 the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, formed in 1991, with membership of 11 of the former 15 Soviet 
republics, by the late 1990s was largely a symbolic union.34  The Baltics opted out 
entirely; Ukraine waffled for a year, unsure of what form and purpose the new 
Commonwealth would take and Georgia finally joined in 1993 as a condition of Russian 
assistance in stabilizing the state following a secession related civil war.  The former 
republics languished in a state of benign neglect for the first few years after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as President Yeltsin looked west and focused his attention on 
building relations with the United States and Europe.  As ethnic conflicts began to wrack 
Russia’s periphery however, frequently involving Russian military forces still stationed 
in former Soviet bases, Moscow began to refocus on its “near abroad.”  While repairing 
economic linkages through regional trade blocs or customs unions and subsidized utility 
and energy resources were the initial focus of CIS activity, security in post-Soviet spaces 
and peacekeeping operations soon occupied many members. 
With so many varied interests in play, the CIS was hardly a unified bloc however 
and has, since its inception, struggled with different perceptions of member states.  Some 
member states have been unable to set aside concerns that Russia, the organization’s 
dominant partner, wanted to use the CIS as a vehicle for the preservation of Moscow’s 
influence in former Soviet space, while they saw membership as giving them access to 
the large Russian market, crucial to their foreign trade.35  Their fears were not unjustified 
and were validated in 1995 when President Yeltsin articulated a Russian strategy for the 
CIS, defining its objective as “the creation of an integrated political and economic  
 
 
                                                 
33 Former Russian Foreign Affairs Minister from 1995-2002, Igor Ivanov writes in his book that when 
the CIS states signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
they were announcing their intentions to “preserve and maintain a common space--socioeconomic, military 
and strategic, and in transportation—on the territory of the former USSR.”  Igor S. Ivanov. The New 
Russian Diplomacy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 82, 84. 
34 Oksana Antonenko, “Assessing the CIS,” Russia Profile, 14 Feb 06.  Online at 
http://www.russiaprofile.org/international/2006/2/14/3248.wbp (accessed February 2006) 
35 Oleksandr Sushko, “The Dark Side of Integration: Ambitions of Domination in Russia’s Backyard,” 
The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 120. 
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community of states” in which Russia should serve as the “leading force in the formation 
of a new system of inter-state political and economic relations on the territory of the post 
Union space.”36  
Others were not as alarmed by this prospect, believing that their best chance for 
economic viability and security existed by maintaining extensive ties to Moscow.  Thus 
cleavages among members were formed with “Unionists” such as Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan seeking closer integration while 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan were less 
committed.37  This made the organization very ineffective at generating unified policies 
and while talk at annual summits boasted of economic and political integration, 
agreements among member states routinely went unimplemented.  Discriminatory trade 
measures such as quotas and antidumping prohibitions were widespread.38  Intra-CIS 
trade declined by over 70% during the 1990s and of the more than 1000 agreements 
drafted by the members, less than 10% were ever implemented.39  Protectionist trade 
measures on Russia’s part, which included levying heavy excise and value added taxes on 
CIS-originated goods, doomed the customs union and as recently as 2000 derailed a 
proposed free trade zone.  Disagreements over how to divide up the hydrocarbon 
resources of the Caspian littoral states, to which Russia initially staked an exclusive 
claim, further divided the group.  A Russian commentator wryly observed that 
“implementing one CIS agreement is more difficult than signing 10 new ones.”40 
For these reasons, while it still continued to use the CIS as a springboard for 
dialogue and joint collective efforts such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 
the Single Economic Space and antiterrorism efforts, Moscow has had to rely upon 
historic mechanisms of influence that it can wield on either a multilateral or bilateral 
basis with greater effectiveness than the CIS offered.  Traditionally the Kremlin has at its 
                                                 
36 F. Stephen Larrabee “Chapter 40: Russia and Its Neighbors: Integration or Disintegration?” 
National Defense University Globalization Study 2001. p. 860. 
37 Henry Hale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian Basin,” SAIS Review 19, no.1 (1999) 
38 Sushko, 119. 
39 Larrabee. 
40 Liz Fuller. “CIS: Death Notices Serve to Revive Moribund Organization.”  RFE-RL article dated 30 
August 2005. 
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disposal four mechanisms of influence that it wields within the CIS: cultural, political, 
economic and military.  These are components in the DIME construct, tools of Russian 
foreign policy, and will be analyzed in each case study to assess how successfully they 
have been applied in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with emphasis on Georgia and 
Uzbekistan respectively.   
D. PART FOUR - KEY IMPERATIVES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Since 2004 it has become clear that Russia has increasingly focused its foreign 
policy efforts on the CIS countries, which some analysts observe are “seen as a reserve to 
be tapped for economic development and security management as well as gradually and 
eventually achieving a more significant, great-power role for Russia internationally.”41  
In an ironic twist of fate, the tables have turned since the time of the Cold War, when 
Moscow “challenged the status quo while Washington defended it. Now, the United 
States is the challenger, with its doctrine of preemption and a policy of spreading global 
democracy, while Russia has become an advocate of state sovereignty, highly skeptical of 
military intervention for humanitarian or other causes.”42  Russia’s pragmatic foreign 
policy path will need to navigate this new international environment, while attempting to 
meet three pressing needs: safeguarding itself and CIS members from the instability of 
political revolutions; exercising its economic imperative to expand Russian GDP; and 
protecting its security interests in its vulnerable southern flank. 
1. Political Security - Impact of the Colored Revolutions 
The wave of “colored revolutions” that swept the states of the former Soviet 
Union from late 2003 through 2005 were largely interpreted by the United States as a 
vindication of democratic and liberal ideals.  The West has looked favorably on the trend 
of “colored revolutions” as evidence of populist mobilization as entrenched authoritarian 
regimes, comprised mainly of former communist elites, were swept from office by the 
popular tide of reform.   The opposition forces that came to power in Georgia’s Rose, 
Ukraine’s Orange and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolutions were seen as more Westward 
oriented, or at least more committed to the political and economic modernization and 
                                                 
41 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (Spring 
2004), 72. 
42 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (Spring 
2004), 76-77.  
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liberalization that would bring these regimes more in line with Western standards and 
institutions. But while Washington championed their revolutionary ideals, Moscow was 
shaken by their populist demonstrations and “unconstitutional” methods of challenging 
the status quo.43  The Kremlin branded the revolutions as a “Western ploy to install pro-
American regimes on Russia’s periphery and then to engineer a regime change in Russia 
itself.”44    
Russia has become highly concerned about further “revolutionary” zeal and the 
implication it has for its own domestic political security as well as that of strong allies 
like Belarus and Armenia.45  In a January 2006 article in the Wall Street Journal, Russian 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov talked about the 
implications of the “uncertainty factor” in global politics.  While it includes unforeseen 
security threats, it also encompasses change in the “geopolitical reality in a region of 
Russia's strategic interest.” Ivanov specifically cites that Russia’s top concern in this 
regard is “the internal situation in some members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, the club of former Soviet republics, and the regions around them.”46 These 
references make clear the Kremlin’s level of concern with colored revolutions in the 
spaces of the former Soviet Union.  Fear of the uncertainty they bring and Western 
involvement in the revolutions aside, Russian analysts also make a case that 
revolutionary change does not necessarily improve domestic conditions, citing Ukraine’s 
recent turnover in government and economic decline since its Orange revolution.47   
                                                 
43 All three revolutions where characterized by widespread, albeit mostly peaceful, popular protests 
organized by local civic movements following contested elections.  In each case, popular opposition leaders 
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45 Alexander A. Pikayev, “A Velvet Divorce,” PONARS Policy Memo 369, December 2005, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  Online at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0369.pdf  
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So concerned are some of Russia’s politicians about the infectious nature of the 
“colored revolutions,” they have attempted to counter the threat by reigning in the 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), both local and foreign-funded, they claim 
helped instigate the popular protests that served as the basis of the revolutions.  The 
process began in July 2005 when President Putin announced he would not allow foreign 
countries to fund what he called “political activities” via nonprofit organizations.  This 
was followed in November 2005 with three proposed amendments in the Duma (with 
backing from the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party) which would require all NGOs to 
get approval from a special state commission within a year in order to be able to pursue 
their activities.   Duma members explained that the proposed changes were “aimed 
chiefly at curtailing money laundering by NGOs” and would “enable the authorities to 
step up their fight against terrorism and extremism on Russian territory.” 48  President 
Putin said the bill was needed to “safeguard the Russian political system against external 
interference and society from terrorist and misanthropic ideologies.”49   
NGOs operating in Russia fear the new law is an attempt by Moscow to curtail 
the activities of those organizations the Kremlin disapproves of.50  Domestic and 
European criticism however, forced President Putin on 5 December 2005 to reassess the 
effort and look at modifying the language of the proposed law.  Several days later the 
Kremlin proposed a “softer” version of the law, deleting the requirement for foreign 
NGOs to re-register with the state commission, allowing them to “operate through 
Russian branches and only inform authorities they exist.”51  The Duma approved the 
amended bill in late December and it was signed into law by President Putin on 10 
January 2006.  While the Kremlin cites the bill is necessary to counter terrorist activity 
and prevent NGOs from laundering money or promoting foreign political agendas, 
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human rights groups disagree.52  The Committee to Protect Journalists criticized the bill 
as “deeply flawed,” giving politicized bureaucrats “authority to interfere in the work of 
NGOs and derail democracy by denying citizens access to information about political and 
economic developments.’’53  The European Commission also criticized the passage of 
the bill, stating it placed unacceptable restrictions one of the few sectors still outside 
direct government control in Russia.54 
While the Kremlin might find the Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan developments 
domestically threatening, some Westernizers argue they could have just the opposite 
effect, reorienting the traditional focus of Russian foreign policy with regard to its 
smaller neighbors. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace argues that 
Moscow may begin approaching the new countries as “full-fledged states, rather than 
parts of the long-defunct whole.”  In the process, “imperialistic illusions will be dropped 
(to the relief of the neighbors), together with the system of imperial preferences (to their 
dismay). Russian economic expansion will continue, but it will be because Russia is close 
to the major poles of international power—the United States, and driven by companies 
(some of them government-owned) pursuing concrete interests and so will not be 
territorial.”55  Tsygankov’s model however would argue that this is not a trend likely to 
take place under a Great Power Normalizer policy.  One of Russia’s goals in expanding 
its influence would be to counter the ability of the West to encourage such grass roots 
movements and give Moscow more influence to affect regime change in the CIS through 
its diplomacy and networking with former Soviet era elites in existing regimes.  Former 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov observes that while Russia feels it is normal for 
CIS states to “diversify their international ties” Russia will not tolerate “attempts by 
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third-party states to act within the CIS in a way that undermines Russian interests, 
excludes Russia from participating, or in any way weakens Russia’s position.”56 
With Russia more actively asserting its role in the former Soviet republics, what 
remains to be seen is whether Moscow and Washington can come to an understanding 
about their respective influence in post-Soviet spaces.  While U.S. Secretary of State Rice 
remarked that Washington was not trying to damage Russia’s interests in this zone, 
stating “we see this as not a zero-sum game, but one in which everybody has much to 
gain, when there are prosperous, democratic countries in the area of the neighboring 
states around Russia,” Russian policy analysts believe the U.S. view is short-sighted and 
ill-informed.   Conditions in post revolutionary states such as Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan in particular, are not ideal, and the revolutionary process often unleashes clan 
confrontation and ethnic antagonisms.  The U.S. is not always best equipped to 
understand the regional nuances and power balances of some of these regimes.  Some 
argue that the underlying post-Soviet social and economic structure merely means that 
with each revolution, one ruling oligarchic elite is replaced by another.57  “In an attempt 
to provide assistance to the democratic opposition without knowing the regional specifics 
of the country, the U.S. inadvertently helped bolster the positions of radical Islamic 
circles [in the case of Kyrgyzstan], which is hardly in its interests. Therefore, it is 
certainly in the interests of both Washington and Moscow to conduct common and 
coordinated policies on post-Soviet territory.”58 
2. The Economic Imperative – Russia’s Path to Great Power Status 
President Putin believes that Russia’s path back to Great Power status is not based 
on military might or a strategic arsenal, but its economy.  In May 2004 President Putin 
announced his goal of doubling Russia’s GDP by the year 2010.  His remarks also called 
for closer ties with the EU and stated that economic integration with the CIS was a 
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priority. 59  The EU is Russia's largest trade partner, accounting for nearly 25% of 
Russia's imports and consuming 35% of its exports.60  In addition, Europe is Russia’s 
largest energy customer and with the world’s largest proven gas reserves it supplies the 
EU approximately 40% of its natural gas needs.61  The bottom line is that Russia needs 
stable relationships with the West to maximize trade, encourage investment and broaden 
market share for he believes is the country’s greatest comparative advantage, its energy 
assets.  That does not mean healthy competition is undesirable, but Russia cannot afford 
to return to the days of outright confrontation with its Western neighbors.    
In order to maximize its energy industry, the primarily tool of its economic 
strategy, the Kremlin has allowed structural, liberalizing reforms to slow and the country 
has increasingly become more “statist,” with greater government control of the economy, 
especially in energy sectors.  Concerned that many oligarchs continued to siphon off 
profits and squander the engine of Russia's economic future, Putin believed that mixed 
public and private ownership, under the ultimate control of the state, was the optimal 
solution. 62   Many of today’s Russian oligarchs purchased state enterprises at rock 
bottom prices and frequently stripped them of their assets, sending money abroad rather 
than reinvesting it back home to make the country’s industrial infrastructure more 
competitive globally.  Under President Putin, Moscow has been buying back into the oil 
and gas industry, beginning to regain control of some parts of this sector lost during 
privatization.   When Russia's 3rd largest oil company, Yukos, was dismantled in 2004 
following the trial and conviction of its owner, political activist Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
portions of its assets were seized by the Kremlin and realigned under the state oil 
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company Rosneft.63  The government has recently acquired ownership of 51% of 
Gazprom, the country’s natural gas monopoly, but realizing that foreign capital is critical 
too, the Kremlin pushed through legislation allowing foreign investors full access to the 
remaining 49 percent.64  Gazprom in turn purchased Russia's fifth-largest oil company, 
Sibneft, acquiring nearly 75 percent of its shares, making it effectively state owned.65  
The Russian news agency RIA Novosti now estimates that 57.4% of the energy sector is 
under state control.66  This has allowed Gazprom to become a potent tool of Russian 
foreign policy. 
Unable to prevent the spate of revolutions in its backyard, Russia has most clearly 
demonstrated its pragmatic foreign policy approach in its energy relationships with CIS 
states.  “As Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova moved to challenge the Russia-controlled 
CIS, the Kremlin was determined to preserve its influence by refusing to subsidize their 
economies and moving to raise prices for its energy… Russia’s leaders also pursued 
aggressive policies of acquiring control over the ex-republics’ strategic property and 
energy transportation.”67  Tsygankov argues that Russia’s recent effort to “correct a 
heavily-distorted price structure for energy” with respect to CIS states is not based on 
fear of marginalization or revenge, but pragmatism and a focus on internal modernization 
and normalization. “The reduction of subsidies, particularly for those who chose to orient 
their policies away from Russia, is a rational response of a growing and energy-rich 
nation in a world of skyrocketing energy prices.”68  What Tsygankov’s model can not 
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adequately explain is if that is the case, why not normalize prices across the CIS, rather 
than selectively?  The relationship between the Kremlin and Gazprom makes it clear that 
Russia will not distinguish between economic and diplomatic means of influence; energy 
will continue to be used as a carrot and/or stick of Russian foreign policy, to be doled out 
at the Kremlin’s discretion to those states which have earned Moscow’s favor. 
3. Russian Security Issues that Dominate the Region 
In general Russia’s perceptions of its imperial and Soviet past have differed from 
those of the USSR’s other constituent republics, especially in the Caucasus.  Russians 
generally believe that during the tsarist and Soviet period they were a “civilizing force 
that had enriched the peoples who had been incorporated into the Russian empire” and 
the Soviet empire in turn had “exploited Russia rather more than it had ill used other parts 
of the country” and that “Russians had suffered disproportionately under Stalinism.”  
This perception is largely at odds with that of other nationalities, for whom “Russia had 
become associated with Soviet power and with their own lack of freedom” setting the 
stage for inevitable misreading of each other’s intentions.69  Nowhere is this divergence 
clearer than on Russia’s southern flank, the Caucasus and Central Asia, two regions that 
dominates Russia’s security perceptions.   
President Putin has referred repeatedly to an “arc of instability,” where Islamic 
extremism threatens regional security, stretching from Southeast Asia to the Balkans, 
cutting through the republics on Russia’s doorstep.70  Current threats and challenges that 
emerge from this “arc of instability” include terrorism, militant separatism and religious 
extremism (read Chechnya), transnational crime and illegal drug trade.71  On its southern 
flank, Russia’s security concerns are focused on the spillover effect of regional instability 
and the desire to maintain a buffer zone with regard to Islamic radicalism.  The complex 
ethnographic make up of the Caucasus in particular means that conflict in any part of the  
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region, north or south, can easily “spill over or provoke conflict in another part of the 
region because of ethnic or cultural linkages.”72  The primary sources of potential 
instability include the following:  
• Internal conflicts in neighboring states (such as Georgia or Azerbaijan) 
which could produce substantial refugee flows that might destabilize 
neighboring Russian populations;  
• Fear that economic collapse in weaker regional states could increase 
general migration to Russia at a rate that could not be supported;  
• Regional terrorism;  
• Rising Islamic extremism in Central Asia could potentially spark Islamic 
revival in Muslim areas of Russia.73   
In addition, the imprint of Chechnya on Russian foreign and security policy can 
not be overstated.  The siege by Chechen rebels of Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater on 23 
October 2002, and the Beslan school on 1 September 2004 have had a profound impact 
on Russian domestic policy.  Beyond the immediate crisis of two wars in Chechnya 
during the past ten years, President Putin also views the breakaway republic as the first 
piece in a string of dominos: 
Should Chechnya fall, it will be followed by the rest of the Northern 
Caucasus. A major and strategically important border region from the 
Black Sea to the Caspian would be lost. Disintegration, however, would 
not stop there: other Muslim-populated areas of the Russian Federation, 
such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, would be at risk. Should they leave 
Russia, the country would effectively be split right down the middle, with 
direct communication between Moscow and Siberia becoming extremely 
difficult.74 
The implication for foreign policy in the “near abroad” is that in order to prevent the 
string of dominos from toppling, Russia desires a “belt of friendly states” in the Southern 
Caucasus.  Such a situation would enable Russia to operate military forces in a 
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permissive environment beyond its borders and contribute to Russian defenses from the 
south against internal instabilities in the North Caucasus.75    
In Central Asia, security interests in the last decade have focused on regional 
security and stopping the spread of Islamic fundamentalism as demonstrated by Russia’s 
peacekeeping efforts in the Tajik civil war.  In addition, since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia had placed great emphasis in maintaining a good security relationship with 
Kazakhstan: first, because of the countries’ long common border, second, because of its 
strategic geographic location as the transit point for all surface routes from Russia to 
Central Asia, and finally as a balancer to Uzbekistan’s large population and military force 
and ambitions of hegemony in Central Asia.76  Relations with Uzbekistan were also 
critical, first because of its tendency toward an independent foreign policy and second 
because its densely populated Ferghana Valley was where radical Islam established a 
stronghold in the region.77 
While terrorism and the spread of Islamic radicalism gets much of the attention in 
Russia’s security calculations, poverty in the CIS states, especially Central Asia, is really 
what could ignite a regional crisis.  It is true that growth leaders such as Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine have contributed to a sharp drop in poverty in some parts of the 
CIS, but millions of others still subsist on only $2 per day, and poverty remains 
particularly high in the three Caucasus countries and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Moldova.78  In Central Asia, the International Crisis Group notes that 
declining living standards and a demographic profile where half the region’s population 
is under 30 years of age poses a significant threat to regional stability.  The Soviet legacy 
of wide spread literacy and a high education standard has given way to an education 
system in crisis and a high probability of political instability. 
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In a world where many people expect progress with each generation, most 
of the young in this region are worse off than their parents. They have 
higher rates of illiteracy, unemployment, poor health, and drug use and are 
more likely to be victims or perpetrators of violence.79 
Ahmed Rashid, in his book Jihad, the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 
notes that despite its wealth of natural resources and the attention of major international 
powers, poverty remains the primary cause of radical Islam in the region.   Wealth from 
western energy investors does not trickle down to the masses, but is concentrated in the 
hands of corrupt regimes, creating an extremely wealthy minority class and breeding 
social discontent due to ever increasing economic disparity.80 
Whilst poverty and unemployment increase—and economic opportunities 
decrease—Central Asia’s debt-ridden societies are ripe for any 
organization or party that offers hope for a better life.  The regimes 
respond with increased repression, viewing not just Islamic militancy but 
all Islamic practice as a threat to their grip on power.  Such 
shortsightedness has only fueled the support for the more radical Islamic 
groups.81 
It remains to be seen whether Russia’s resurgent role in the CIS, particularly in Central 
Asia, will address this key underpinning of its security strategy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Russian foreign policy continues to be dominated by the issue of Russia’s identity 
and its relationship with the West.  President Putin’s approach, described by Tsygankov 
as Great Power Normalization, tries to walk the line between integrating with the West 
and balancing against it.  It asserts that economic development is the path to Russia’s 
return to Great Power status and to this end Russia must maintain strategic relationships 
with the West in the areas of economics and security.  It also asserts that Russia should be 
the dominant influence in the former Soviet republics, not through political and military 
reintegration but primarily through economic mechanisms of influence developed 
through bilateral relations.  Finally, three key imperatives have emerged in Russian 
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foreign policy in President Putin’s term of office: a disdain for the populist based Color 
Revolutions and desire to curb any future occurrences both within Russia and in the CIS; 
the growth of a state controlled energy sector; and the vulnerability of Russia’s southern 
flank in its security perceptions.     
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III. GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS – THORNY ISSUES 
FOLLOWING THE ‘ROSE REVOLUTION’ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2005, Gen. 
James Jones, head of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), discussed the strategic value 
of U.S. involvement in the Caucasus: 
The Caucasus is increasingly important to our interests. Its air corridor has 
become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and our 
bases in Europe. Caspian oil, carried through the Caucasus, may constitute 
as much as 25 percent of the world’s growth in oil production over the 
next five years ... This region is a geographical pivot point in the spread of 
democracy and free market economies to the states of Central and 
Southwest Asia.82 
Compared to Central Asia, where Western involvement has primarily been 
operationally focused on support to the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. commitment to 
the Caucasus runs deeper.  On March 8, 2006, in testimony before the House 
International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, 
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs delivered the following 
remarks: 
Georgia has been called a success for our freedom agenda, though its work 
has just begun. Since the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili’s 
government has taken Georgia from a failing state to a democratizing 
democratic nation with a growing market-economy. During President 
Bush’s May 2005 visit to Georgia, he promised the United States would 
do its utmost to help the people of Georgia consolidate these changes. 
Georgia’s future lies in the Euro-Atlantic community. The hard work of 
reform is Georgia’s, but the U.S. Government will do what we can to help 
Georgia help itself, working with our European allies, in NATO and the 
EU.83  
Washington has continued its close work with European institutions to resolve conflicts 
in the Southern Caucasus and advocates empowering and strengthening multilateral 
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institutions like NATO and the OSCE to achieve this end.  In light of Russia’s resurgent 
emphasis on becoming the dominant influence in the former Soviet Union, this 
involvement has the potential to conflict with Russian interests in the region, especially in 
the state of Georgia.  This case study on the Caucasus and Georgia begins with a survey 
of Russia’s strategic interests in the region and follows with analysis of Russia’s efforts 
to increase its influence in Georgia using the DIME construct developed in Chapter II. 
B. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN GEORGIA AND THE 
CAUCASUS 
Russia analysts observe that “Russia’s new central battleground is in Chechnya 
and increasingly in the rest of the North Caucasus, where it fights Islamist terrorists, 
separatists, and bandits.” 84  Lack of progress in implementing an effective strategy that 
addresses the corruption and poverty of Russia’s southern rim breeds frustration, and 
leads to human rights abuses that only serve to attract new fighters to the cause.  In the 
words of the Kremlin’s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the “subterranean fire” 
of regional instability continues to rage unabated. 85  For this reason the Caucasus will 
continue to be an area of vital national interest to Russia.  The old East-West axis that 
pinned NATO forces against a massive Soviet conventional army is gone and the new era 
of the Southern offensive has been ushered in. The after-effect of the disastrous first 
Chechen war was a shift in strategic focus.  As Dmitri Trenin noted, “Central European 
plains were replaced by the Caucasus mountains (and potentially, the mountains and 
deserts of Central Asia); familiar peer enemies by primitive but deadly warriors; 
operations of groups of armies were replaced with a mixture of counter-insurgency 
operations, special forces engagements [and] police mopping up campaigns.”86   
With the longest border on Russia’s unstable Southern rift zone, Georgia has 
figured prominently in Moscow’s foreign and security strategy.  Russia’s key interests in 
Georgia are characterized by efforts to ensure regional stability, retain military influence, 
“protect” the Russian diaspora and increase economic ties.  Each of these goals is 
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developed below to provide a glimpse of Russia’s view of the Caucasus. The chapter then 
examines the cultural, diplomatic, economic and military means that Russia has used to 
advance its agenda in Georgia. Finally, these efforts are compared to the tenets of 
Tsygankov’s Great Power Normalization model to determine whether they meet its 
criteria of a pragmatic Russian approach to foreign policy. 
1. Regional Stability 
The Caucasus have historically served as a buffer between the Orthodox Christian 
empire and Muslim powers to Russia’s south.  That geopolitical reality has not changed.  
With what Russians generally refer to as “Wahhabi” (Salafi) influence growing in 
Uzbekistan and inside Russia itself, Moscow is deeply concerned about instability in its 
"soft underbelly."  The source of the instability, Chechnya, is largely a secessionist crisis 
and the subject of Western criticism that Russia’s heavy handed military operations in the 
region created an environment where militant Islam could get a foothold.87  Russia has 
always been stung by this criticism and has sought to portray the Chechen conflict as part 
of the larger Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  Continued incidents of violence in the 
Northern Caucasus have spread eastward from Chechnya to Dagestan and westward to 
Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and most recently, Kabardino-Balkaria where coordinated 
attacks against assorted federal and security installations rocked the capital city of 
Nalchik in mid-October 2005. 88   To Russia’s domestic audience such a spread of 
violence lends  credibility to President Putin’s “domino theory” about how the whole 
southern region of Russia can be destabilized, potentially causing Russia to lose control 
of the strategic border region from the Caspian to the Black Sea.  If this happens, the 
Kremlin argues, energy supplies from the Caspian basin will be in danger, and terrorist 
access to weapons of mass destruction technology will expand.89  Russians fear that with 
Islamic extremism no longer contained to Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus, but 
spreading to places like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, successful secessionist movements  
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in these regions could effectively split Russia down the middle, with lines of 
communication between Moscow and its resource rich Siberian environs extremely 
difficult.90  
Regional stability also means that the Kremlin does not want to see pro-Western 
governments coming into power in the former Soviet republics.  This means no more 
“colored revolutions” that disrupt the political status quo that Moscow has fostered since 
the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin publicly couches this concern by 
criticizing not regime change itself, but the manner in which it takes place – namely 
through what it considers unlawful and unconstitutional populist demonstrations. What 
makes Russia’s position on the “constitutionality” of these revolutions dubious, from a 
western perspective, is that the Kremlin does not apply the same standards to 
authoritarian regimes which violate their own laws and jail or kill their own citizens, such 
as Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
2. Military Influence 
Georgia, like Armenia and Azerbaijan, contained remnants of the Soviet 
Transcaucasian Military District after the break-up of the USSR.  After 1991, Russia 
assumed control of all former Soviet forces in Georgia, including approximately 20,000 
ground troops and numerous vessels and bases of the Black Sea Fleet and Border Guards.  
While many troops were subsequently withdrawn (troop strength from these units 
decreased from 20,000 to around 8500 by 1996) five bases and several strategically 
significant ports remained and Russia has been very reluctant to give up control of them 
over the past decade.  In addition, while overall military strength was decreasing, the 
numbers of Russian soldiers in Georgia’s breakaway province of Abkhazia was 
increasing as Moscow supplied the bulk of peacekeepers that were mandated by the CIS 
to enforce the 1994 peace accords.  Today, with the last two bases still in the process of 
closing and peacekeepers in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, approximately 3000 
Russian troops remain in Georgia. 
3. “Protection” of the Russian Diaspora 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left approximately 25 million Russians living 
beyond the borders of their ethnic homeland.  In many cases these Russians had migrated 
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to the former republics as part of Moscow’s nationalities strategy, a highly volatile policy 
whose divide and conquer methodology during the Soviet era spawned deep seated ethnic 
and political conflicts.  Russian citizens now found themselves minorities in newly 
independent states without official safety lines to Moscow.  Russia was therefore very 
“proprietary” over states where ethnic Russian minorities became “stranded” outside the 
motherland. 91  
In Georgia, while ethnic Russians are the 2nd largest minority group, they 
represented only 6 percent of the population in 1989. In Armenia and Azerbaijan ethnic 
Russians number under 3 percent.92  Although this minority was not a target of anti-
Russian policies, Moscow nevertheless has used the security and well-being of the 
diaspora at least as rhetorical justification to strengthen Russian presence.  While 
Russians in Georgia did not represent a political threat to Tbilisi or a security problem for 
Moscow, the Kremlin feared the economic impact of an exodus of Russians to Russia and 
the effect a potential conflict in Georgia might have on the Russian population in the 
North Caucasus. Fundamentally, the Kremlin believed that it must stabilize any conflict 
within Georgia (whether it directly involved Russian minorities or not) which might 
worsen inter-ethnic disputes within Russia itself.93   
4. Increase in Economic Ties 
At the time of the break up of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of wealthiest 
republics.  Russian interests in Georgia included agriculture, especially in the semi-
tropical Black Sea areas, coal mines, a major port in Sukhumi, railway links, and tourism, 
particularly in the resort areas of Abkhazia and Ajaria.  Finally, Georgia was a significant 
transit point for Caspian oil and gas coming from Baku, Azerbaijan, as well as a source of 
hydroelectric power and minerals.  Russia’s current foreign policy continues to focus on 
securing favorable economic relations and agreements, especially with regard to natural 
resource transit rights. 
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C. RUSSIAN MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE: EFFORTS TO USE 
DIPLOMACY, INFORMATION, SECURITY AND ECONOMICS TO 
ACHIEVE ITS INTERESTS IN THE CAUCASUS  
Western oriented, liberal leaders such as Yeltsin, in order to separate Russia 
economically from the rest of the republics for the purpose of pursuing radical market 
reforms, sought to dismantle the Soviet Union and create in its place the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS).94  Others, particularly the military and defense industrial 
establishment initially believed the formation of the CIS to be nothing more than a name 
change, a way to cast off the Soviet communist legacy without jeopardizing the 
fundamental political and institutional bureaucracy.  Thus the CIS was created in 1991 
amid much turmoil and its nature was hotly debated by liberal reformers on the one hand 
and anti-reform neo-imperialists on the other.95   Apart from the Baltic States, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan were the only two of the remaining twelve Soviet republics that did not 
initially join the CIS during its first year of creation.  Both had been experienced strong 
nationalist movements and Moscow’s violent repression of political demonstrations 
during the Gorbachev era, and these crises discredited local communist efforts at forming 
any new “neo-Soviet” political unions.96  Despite their initial reluctance, both Tbilisi and 
Baku were coerced into joining the organization two years later when internal instability 
forced them to turn to Moscow for security assistance in the management of civil wars.  
97 
Given Georgia’s stormy CIS initiation, and its orientation as one of the more 
independent minded members, Russia has frequently had stormy relations with the 
former republic, a trend that has deepened since the “Rose Revolution” that brought to 
power Western-leaning Mikhail Saakashvili.  While Moscow appears to have gained an 
upper hand in Central Asia, successfully orchestrating US withdrawal from a strategic 
base in Uzbekistan, as well as signing a historic mutual defense treaty with Tashkent, it  
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does not appear to have made as significant inroads in the Caucasus and more 
specifically, its relations with Georgia appear to have become more combative since 
2004. 
1. Information / Cultural Mechanisms 
While a 2004 survey mapping the attitude of 1,472 Tbilisi residents toward 
different ethnic groups revealed a 64% positive rating for Russians, Moscow’s cultural 
mechanisms, such as its imperial legacy, media and language, appear to be largely 
ineffective in maintaining its influence in Georgia.98  When faced with their imperial 
legacy, Russians generally believe the “periphery” is ungrateful to Moscow for bringing 
it “civilization.” Not only did Russia bear the bulk of the expense of industrialization, it 
defended the periphery from external threats such as the defense of the Georgians from 
the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century.  In contrast, residents of the Caucasus no longer 
perceive these efforts as vital or important.  Today, their real concern revolves around 
Moscow's continued support for separatism in regions like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Business priorities, such as energy transit, oil, gas and electricity 
supply and migration, dictate attitudes towards Russia in the "near abroad" much more 
than historic memories do.99  For the younger generation, the importance of Russia as a 
destination for education and employment is diminishing, being replaced by the lure of 
most Western influences of Europe and even Turkey.  A brief history of independence 
(from 1918-1921), the small percentage of ethnic Russians in the Caucasus, and the 
violent Soviet crackdown against rebellion in 1986 all serve to minimize the cultural 
influence that Russia can bring to bear.100 
Unlike Central Asia, where there is very little indigenous free press and many 
residents listen to Russian media, the Georgian press is largely considered to be free, and 
journalists regularly criticize government officials and their conduct.  While Tbilisi 
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authorities finance some publications and operate the national state TV and radio 
networks, Georgians have access to western press and approximately 200 privately-
owned newspapers. 101  In addition, only about 10% of Georgians speak Russian, further 
strengthening Georgian identity and a sense of independence. In contrast, in Central Asia, 
the Russian language is still widely spoken, especially in academic, political and business 
circles, and serves as the common denominator in educated discourse.   
In an effort to increase its “soft power” and counter perceptions that many 
Western NGOs in post-Soviet states promote national languages and the use of English as 
the new language of international communication, Russia has launched a new offensive 
consistent with a foreign policy of Great Power Normalization.  The Kremlin has recently 
proposed that the free education quota for students from the CIS (currently set at 1%) 
should be increased, allowing more students from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States to get a free education in Russia's higher educational establishments. President 
Putin also spoke out against cutting the number of departments which Russian colleges 
and universities have in the CIS and announcing that Moscow State University is 
expanding its network of branches in the Commonwealth of Independent States, an effort 
the Russian leadership will facilitate.102   
2. Diplomatic / Political Mechanisms 
While Russia’s cultural influence in the Caucasus may be weak, Moscow has 
several geopolitical levers it can use to influence its smaller neighbors, the most effective 
of which are their internal secessionist conflicts.  A March 2005 EU country report, 
drafted as part of its neighborhood action plans, described progress toward reform in 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and providing detailed overviews of their progress 
toward adopting EU values such as rule of law, democracy, and a market economy.103  
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The EU generally considers Georgia to be the most advanced of its Caucasian neighbors 
with relatively few problems identified in terms of domestic political reforms. Of note in 
the criticism of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are breaches of fundamental freedoms, a 
general lack of willingness to reform and “widespread Russian influence on decision-
making in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.” 104 
Perhaps emboldened by the EU’s hesitation to become directly involved in 
helping resolve Georgia’s “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or assist in 
monitoring the border between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has continued to make the 
most of its political mechanisms.  One includes its veto in the OSCE, an organization 
Georgia has sought to involve to a greater degree in its internal stability efforts.  Since the 
establishment of a Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire 1992, a four-party Mixed (or Joint) 
Control Commission has been responsible for monitoring and implementing the peace.  
The Commission is comprised of representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, 
and Russia's oblast of North Ossetia, a composition that seems blatantly biased toward 
South Ossetia.  Georgia has long lobbied that the Commission in its current format is 
"ineffective" and that the OSCE and other international organizations should take a more 
active part in developing and implementing a peace process.105  In Georgia’s opinion, 
whenever Russia feels that the role of the Commission in the conflict resolution process 
is threatened, Moscow orchestrates a minor concession or position that demonstrates the 
Commission’s utility to outside observers and ensures Russia continued political 
leverage. 
An even more potent lobbying tool is Moscow’s sponsorship of Georgia’s two 
breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as those in Moldova and 
Azerbaijan).  Both separatist regions are highly dependent on Moscow for support and 
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therefore highly susceptible to Kremlin influence.  Most South Ossetian citizens hold 
Russian passports and Russian laws provide the breakaway region with its legal code. 
The region’s ties with Russia provide it with what little economic activity exists in the 
area.  Several Russian officials have even been appointed to posts within the breakaway 
region’s government, which provokes concern in Tbilisi. In an interview with RIA 
Novosti, Georgian President Saakashvili was quoted as saying “when the chief of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) for [the Russian republic of] Mordovia is appointed as 
head of the South Ossetian ministry of security, and when the deputy chief of the Siberian 
military district is named as the South Ossetian government’s chief military aide, then 
we’re not talking about regular personnel changes."106  Likewise in Abkhazia, many 
residents have Russian passports and the Russian ruble is also commonly used in trade.  
Russia maintains peacekeeping forces there that act as guarantors of each region’s 
defacto separatism from Tbilisi.  “Because of its unrecognized status Abkhazia has few 
ties apart from its link with Russia. The CIS peacekeeping force that patrols the ceasefire 
zone is made up entirely of Russian Federation soldiers. To many (though by no means 
all) in Abkhazia, Russia is perceived as the one source of military and economic security 
to which they can appeal.” 107   
Georgian experts believe that these regions’ continued dependence on Russia is a 
serious hindrance to the peace process.  “Russian patronage permits regional leaders to 
adopt more radical positions than they would otherwise adopt,” which  leads Moscow to 
exercise influence that limits the choices Georgian politicians can make in negotiations 
with the separatist leaders.  With Moscow subsidizing their de facto independence, 
separatist leaders do not have to enter into negotiations that would result in anything 
other than remaining a Russian protectorate.  The Kremlin defends this position by 
pointing out the West’s role as protector of separatist regions such as Kosovo, alluding to 
a double standard in how the international community views Moscow’s support of the 
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breakaway regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States.   In addition, in Russia’s 
eyes, the status quo of the frozen conflicts may be strategic.  If Moscow were not the 
arbiter of a resolution to these internal conflicts, Georgia would be “free to maneuver 
itself, united, toward NATO membership.  For Russia, defacto independence for the 
breakaway regions is better than nothing.” 108  On the issue of NATO membership a 
Russian pundit observes: “No-one's going to be asking Georgia to join NATO in the 
foreseeable future…Because it has a territorial problem and because it isn't a democratic 
country…They don't want to be reconciled to their ethnic minorities but to bring them to 
their knees by using NATO's military support.”109    
While the Kremlin does not currently formally recognize either region’s 
independence, it maintains close political ties with their leaders.  In September 2005, 
Moscow hosted the “self-styled leaders” of Georgia's breakaway republics of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, as well as Moldova's Transdniester and Azerbaijan’s Armenian 
enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The representatives pledged to pursue independence and 
Russian lawmaker Konstantin Zatulin, from the Kremlin-directed United Russia party, 
called the sovereignty of these entities a “reality that should be accepted.”110 Such 
behavior only serves to exacerbate the perception that Russia is anything but a “neutral” 
peacekeeper in Georgia’s conflict zones.  With President Saakashvili having made 
resolution of Georgia’s frozen conflicts part of this campaign, his job security and 
political clout is tied to progress on that front.  Russia on the other hand may be counting 
on the internal conflicts to lead to regime change, perhaps to a more accommodating, pro-
Moscow leader, if voters become disillusioned about Saakashvili ability to reach 
agreement with the Russian backed separatist regions. 111 As Georgia continues to edge 
closer to Western institutions, Moscow appears not to have backed away from political 
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mechanisms as a means to keep Georgia off balance; however Georgia’s proximity to 
Europe allows it to counter the Kremlin’s influence with its own political levers such as 
the regional organizations GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice. 
In response to efforts by Russian hardliners to tighten up CIS integration in 1997, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova banded together, with U.S. support, in a new 
geopolitical alignment called GUAM with the aim off fostering regional cooperation 
outside the boundaries of Russia and the CIS. 112  Like the CIS, GUAM was largely a 
paper tiger in its early years.  The new Western orientation of post revolution Georgia 
and Ukraine, as well as the election of a pro-Western president in Moldova, seems to 
have sparked a common vision of European integration among the core members and the 
group may be revived.  A 2005 GUAM summit (the first since the colored revolutions in 
Georgia and Ukraine) promised a higher profile as the group focused its attention on 
Moldova’s separatist conflict in the Transdniester region and raised the possibility of 
GUAM troops under the aegis of OSCE as an alternative to Russian peacekeepers in 
Georgia and Moldova.113   
In addition to participating in GUAM, Georgia and Ukraine are spearheading a 
new regional organization that could present another potential alternative to the CIS.   
The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) is made up of the former Communist 
states Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Macedonia, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, together with GUAM members Moldova and Azerbaijan.  
Some Georgian officials have stated that the group would effectively become “an axis of 
democratic countries that do not with to remain in Russia’s orbit” but Ukraine has 
downplayed any anti-Russian implications.  Georgian policy analysts liken the 
organization to something in between the EU and the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, 
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an alternative to those FSU states caught short of realistic expectations of EU 
membership but whose political leanings are toward democracy and the West.114 
While Moscow has a generally benign view of the EU’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy, primarily because the EU has expressed its reluctance to get 
involved in the region’s frozen conflicts, it feels much more challenged by the more 
proactive approach of the U.S. in the Caucasus.  Moscow perceives the U.S. as having a 
“regime change” agenda, trying to bring former Soviet republics firmly into the Western 
camp.115  Russia was not happy with President Bush’s pro-democracy rhetoric and 
resented his 2004 Georgian tour, especially on the heels of what the Kremlin called ‘US 
meddling’ in the “revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine.116  Washington may exercise its 
diplomatic rhetoric to promote democracy abroad, but it still needs the Kremlin’s 
cooperation on issues such as passing the revised treaty on Conventional Forces in 
Europe, and addressing nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea.  While it continues 
to promote military and economic ties with Tbilisi, Washington will likely maintain a 
relatively low profile on the issue of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia.  Ultimately, 
Tbilisi will have to work out its disagreements with Moscow without Washington’s direct 
support, instead letting OSCE, EU and/or NATO field their calls for help.117 
One of Tsygankov’s key tenets of Great Power Normalization was its toleration of 
limited Western presence in the former Soviet republics.  Nevertheless, Moscow still 
appears to try to balance any Western influence in what it perceives as its back yard.  In 
the Caucasus this specifically applies to the U.S., NATO and to a lesser degree, the EU.  
The interplay of great powers on Russia’s southern flank is still largely perceived by 
Russia’s political elite as a zero-sum game.  Russia has resisted attempts to 
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internationalize conflict zones in Georgia and Azerbaijan (as well as Moldova) beyond 
the modest roles currently played by OSCE and the UN.  Their interpretation appears to 
be that a rise in U.S. or European influence necessarily means Russia’s loss.118  In the 
diplomatic dimension, Russian foreign policy actively seeks to balance Western influence 
in the region.  In the context of the frozen conflicts, Russia could engage in what 
Tsygankov characterizes as “security cooperation with the West,” one of the tenets of 
Great Power Normalization.  Its reluctance to share the burden of managing and resolving 
these conflicts weakens its position as a pragmatic regional hegemon, causing its policies 
to be labeled more assertive than perhaps they are intended to be.  Georgia and 
Azerbaijan’s pursuit of different political alternatives for regional integration, options 
that do not include Russia (such as GUAM and CDC), further highlights their perception 
that Russia’s attempts at influence are not constructive, but self-interested, intended to 
maintain Moscow’s diplomatic mechanisms of influence.  
3. Economic Mechanisms 
According to Energy Efficiency Center Georgia, a renewable energy consultancy 
sponsored by the European Union, Georgia’s domestic oil, gas and coal supplies only 
meet 20% of its annual demand.  Unlike its oil rich neighbor, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
produces mainly hydropower, which provides enough electricity for the spring, summer 
and autumn when water levels are high.  When water levels are low in the winter months, 
energy resources must be imported from Russia, Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.119 
Accordingly, one of Russia’s strongest mechanisms of influence in Georgia is economic, 
specifically energy.  Rising oil prices and a monopoly over pipelines have allowed 
Moscow to wield this tool very effectively.120  Two distinct strategies have emerged: 
first, expansion of energy giants such as Gazprom through acquisition of shares in, or 
joint ventures with, foreign gas and energy related companies; second, control of energy 
                                                 
118 Andrei Zagorski, “Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood,” Chaillot Paper #74.  January 2005, 
p69-70 
119Eurasia Insight article “Promises still power Georgia’s electricity by Molly Corso 1/24/05  
120 A significant trend in the CIS is Russian attempts to acquire strategic energy assets in the FSU and 
Eastern Europe. Just recently Gazprom and Itera received ownership rights to the Armenian gas distribution 
network and pipeline system in exchange for cancellation of Armenian debts. Eurasia Insight article 
“Promises still power Georgia’s electricity by Molly Corso 1/24/05 
47 
prices through monopoly of transportation mechanisms.  Both of these efforts are 
consistent with Tsygankov’s Great Power Normalization. 
Through deals made in the summer of 2003, Russia’s electricity monopoly, RAO 
UES, acquired 75% of the electrical distribution grid that feeds Tbilisi.  It is now 
estimated that it controls 20% or Georgia’s generating capacities and 35% of its 
electricity supplies to its consumers.121  At the same time Gazprom made a “handshake 
deal” that would have given it a dominant position in Georgia’s energy market. 122   The 
Gazprom deal was never ratified however, due to the change in political leadership 
following the Rose revolution.  In addition, an influx of western aid, including money 
from the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Fund, targeted rehabilitation of 
parts of the energy infrastructure.  The issue will likely continue to draw debate however 
as competing Tbilisi ministries try to balance the need for economic reform and 
privatization against strategic and geopolitical economic interests.   
Against this backdrop Moscow continues its efforts to increase its foothold in 
Georgia’s energy sector.  Early in 2005, talks with Gazprom about selling the country’s 
gas distribution stations, a heating plant and a backline pipeline were scuttled.  At a 
March 4 news conference, Energy Minister Nika Gilauri told reporters that the 
government will not sell state-owned energy-sector assets to Russian companies, citing 
the need to preserve the security of the country’s energy network. Necessary funds for 
minimal pipeline repairs were allocated from the 2005 state budget as well as 
international donors and commercial credits.123  These efforts clearly demonstrate that 
Georgia is distrustful of Russia’s attempts to gain further economic leverage through its 
energy infrastructure. 
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Under the Saakashvili regime Georgia has made tremendous strides to address the 
electricity shortages that plagued the state since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Power 
fluctuations in the capital drastically improved over the years with only periodic 
blackouts in the fall due to faulty transmission lines and general disrepair of the 
electricity infrastructure.  Outside the capital however, home to approximately 68 percent 
of Georgia’s population, areas would sometimes go several weeks or even months 
without power.  Aged infrastructure, general disrepair, pervasive corruption and problems 
with bill collection have plagued the system.  In December 2004, Georgian Prime 
Minister Zurab Zhvania pledged to spend $70 million to secure reliable electricity 
supplies by late 2005, and the results have been very positive.124  A large scale effort to 
install 10,000 communal electricity meters nationwide (each shared by 40-50 local 
consumers) was completed in only three months and provided a short term and more 
economical fix to chronic billing problems.  In a recent interview Georgian Energy 
Minister Mika Gilauri announced that there is now a 24-hour electricity supply across the 
country (as long as consumers pay the bill).125 
Despite progress on its energy issues, Georgia is still vulnerable to economic 
pressure from Moscow.  Russia views itself correctly as the “economic engine” of the 
CIS.  It has been pushing for higher prices for its energy, which it had continued to 
supply to its former republics at discount rates since the fall of the Soviet Union.  In 
November 2005 Moscow announced it would begin charging the Baltic states, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia “world prices” for its natural gas.  This would in effect nearly 
double the current Georgian rate of $60 per 1000 cubic meters to $110 beginning in 
January 2006.  This move has been widely criticized as being ‘political’ versus market 
driven because only those “western leaning” countries that Russia is at odds with appear 
to be targeted.  Armenia for example would still continue to receive Russian gas at a 
subsidized rate (or receive only a moderate token increase) and no mention has been 
made of increases for Central Asian countries which receive gas through Russian 
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pipelines.  Georgia countered the gas price hikes with agreements to purchase 
Kazakhstan natural gas at a discount, only to be thwarted by Russian transit fees that 
would bring the price back up to $110.  Moscow’s stranglehold on gas pipelines from 
Central Asia leave Kazakhstan no mechanisms for direct export of natural gas outside of 
Russia’s borders and therefore no realistic possibility of a bargain for discounted gas for 
Georgia.   
While Ukraine and Georgia attempted to compensate for increased energy rates 
by countering with their own proposals for increased transit fees for Russian gas being 
transported beyond their borders, the impact of these efforts is likely to be minimal.  In an 
effort to liberate Russian energy from being held hostage to transit fees, Moscow has 
embarked on numerous export diversification projects.  In September 2005, President 
Putin and German Chancellor Shroeder signed an agreement to construct the trans-Baltic 
North European Gas Pipeline.  Such a pipeline would allow Gazprom to bypass 
“sometimes unfriendly neighbors – Ukraine, Belarus and Poland” in order to reach its 
West European customers, especially Germany which imports 37% of its natural gas 
supply from Russia.126  Some Western analysts have described the project as a “white 
elephant” being constructed purely for political purposes, allowing Moscow in the near 
future to be able to turn the energy screws on Germany the way it has on its former 
republics.127   
Gazprom’s winter 2005/2006 gas war not only secured it higher prices (albeit 
offset by higher transit fees for supplying Armenia via Georgia’s pipeline) but also 
another toehold on Georgian gas infrastructure.  While not successful in buying into 
Georgia’s main north-south gas pipeline, Moscow came to an agreement with Tbilisi to 
create a 50-50 joint venture to provide maintenance of the pipeline and construct trunks 
to other cities and related infrastructure.128  The prospect of a joint venture based on 
parity control has caused consternation with some observers who wonder why Gazprom 
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was able to secure such a large share.  Similar ventures in other East European countries 
allow Gazprom much less control.  Experts observe that “these shares make it clear 
where Russia controls the situation and which countries it can influence.” 129  In the 
meantime, Georgia will continue efforts to diversify its natural gas supply.  In 2006 it 
plans to begin purchases of natural gas from neighboring Azerbaijan via the new Shah-
Deniz pipeline that runs from Baku, Azerbaijan to Erzerum, Turkey via Tbilisi.130   If 
Gazprom were to gain control over the pipelines intended to supply Turkey however, it 
could threaten the viability of the entire project and squash any hopes of energy 
diversification.   
The Winter 2005/2006 gas war clearly demonstrate the ruthless nature of Russia’s 
energy agenda and added fuel to the accusation that efforts are politically motivated, 
targeting those countries the Kremlin has labeled as “disloyal,” those who eschew a pro-
Moscow orientation.131  In a closed door session with Kremlin politicians, Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that gas, oil and electricity were the country’s 
principal diplomatic resources, and implying that the “whole diverse arsenal of economic 
pressure tools” were going to be applied to insufficiently loyal CIS neighbors. 132 The 
inconsistency in applying “market corrections” across the board to FSU customers 
without regard to political orientation undermines the pragmatic nature of Moscow’s 
policies.  It is difficult to understand how economic liberalization and transparent 
bilateral arrangements (goals of Great Power Normalization) can be established when 
costly, imperial practices of subsidizing some select states’ energy needs still remain in 
place. The most effective demonstration of Moscow’s pragmatism would be a  
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comprehensive, equitable phased approach to energy cost adjustments that would be 
transparent and more in line with fair market practices, but such a plan has not yet been 
articulated. 
4. Military/Security Mechanisms 
At a 28 November 2005 meeting in Brussels with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab 
Noghaideli, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that “the door is 
open” for Georgia’s eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance and Georgia has 
expressed hope it might be among the next list of invitees expected to be announced in 
2008. 133  Georgia has signaled its intentions to pursue NATO membership and move 
toward closer alignment with the EU.  Aside from its economic mechanisms of influence, 
Russia continues its ability to sway Georgian policies by playing upon the states most 
significant weakness, its internal instability.    Three primary sources of tension in the 
area of security exist between Moscow and Tbilisi: the issue of border monitoring along 
their common border; the continued presence of Russian military bases on Georgian 
territory; and the intractable secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
According to Tsygankov’s model, these types of issues should be secondary to economic 
interests, or at least should be characterized by cooperative bilateral or collective action 
oriented at tackling mutual security threats, but relations with Georgia do not resemble 
this paradigm. 
a. Border Monitoring 
Separatist groups that use militant and terrorist tactics, such as the 
Chechens in the Caucasus, routinely finance their efforts through criminal activities such 
as drug trafficking and the underground economy.  “The vast and deep-rooted shadow 
economy in Chechnya, and in the North Caucasus as a whole, is based primarily on large-
scale illicit oil production and trade in oil products. In fact, more than narcotics, oil 
products, alcohol, and tobacco products are the main illicit goods smuggled through 
Russia’s borders with other Caucasian states.”134  The trafficking of goods and people, to 
include Chechen fighters, makes border monitoring a high priority issue in Russia’s 
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relations with Georgia.  Georgia in turn has made border security a priority and sought 
the assistance of the West in its efforts. 
Tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow palpably increased when Moscow 
used its veto in the OSCE in December 2004 to terminate the organization’s monitoring 
mission on the border between the two countries, arguing that it was ineffective.  Russia 
has accused Georgia repeatedly of failing to safeguard against Chechen fighters who seek 
refuge in Georgia’s rugged terrain.  Moscow did agree to a new OSCE training mission 
of more than 800 Georgian border guards on modern methods of controlling rugged 
frontiers, a program which began in April 2005 and is scheduled to run through the end 
of the year.  OSCE has made it clear however that the current training program “is not a 
replacement for the international force of OSCE monitors who previously patrolled 
Georgia’s borders with Chechnya, Daghestan and Ingushetia.” 135  
Tbilisi is dissatisfied with the limited scope of a training mission and has 
unsuccessfully lobbied the EU to take over the monitoring duties.  Georgia feels the 
presence of an impartial political force on the ground provides verification that Georgia 
was securing its border, robbing Moscow of the opportunity to accuse Tbilisi of 
harboring extremists.  “What is most important -- what was most important -- in this 
border-monitoring operation was this political [segment] which existed under the OSCE 
framework.  A political [segment] where observers could declare that there was no 
violence on the borders, that there were no problems, because trainers and officers could 
not make some kind of political statement -- and that is why Russians are not against a 
training mission,” explained Georgian parliament speaker Nino Burdjanadze during a 
visit to the EU.  Of concern to Georgia is that Moscow could once again try to execute a 
pre-emptive strike against Chechen terrorists claimed to hide in Georgia’s Pankisi 
Gorge.136  Resistance to an EU monitoring effort (versus training) appears to be related to 
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a number of member states like France, Germany and Italy fearing that such an operation 
would harm their relations with Russia. 137 
b. Russian Bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki, Georgia 
Russian military goals in the countries of the Common Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), the military bloc of the CIS, which includes Russia, Belarus, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are clear: joint control of borders and 
air space; joint rapid reaction task forces to combat terrorism and trafficking; Russian 
bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and no foreign bases. 138  Georgia 
however is not a CSTO member and has lobbied, since the 1999 OSCE summit in 
Istanbul, for closure of its former Soviet bases and withdrawal of Russian troops, a move 
that Russia long delayed with protests of budget shortfalls and logistical difficulties.  
Agreements to finally close the bases were signed on 31 May 2005 and withdrawals 
scheduled to be completed by 2008.   
If completed successfully, the redeployment would represent a significant 
diplomatic victory for Georgia and significantly limit Russian military influence, in 
essence leaving only the CIS mandated peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
military leverage.  Russia has attempted to mitigate these closures with vague language in 
the agreements calling for the creation of a Georgian-Russian Anti-Terrorism Center that 
would use some of the military personnel and material-technical facilities and 
infrastructure of Batumi.  If so, Georgian critics argue, Tbilisi will have “traded the old 
bases for new [military] equipment and that will be even worse.” 139  Opposition party 
leaders suggest that if there is to be such a center, it be expanded to include an American 
and even European presence so as to limit Russian influence. 
Russia’s stubborn attempt to maintain these bases was not consistent with 
Great Power Normalization.  The number of personnel was small, equipment outdated, 
                                                 
137 RFE/RL article “Georgia: Tbilisi Lobbies EU for Border Monitors, Harder Stance on Russia” by 
Ahto Lobjakas dated 12 April 2005. 
138 Ariel Cohen. “Competition over Eurasia: Are the U.S. and Russia on a Collision Course?” October 
24, 2005. Heritage Lecture #901.  Online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/hl901.cfm 
139 Eurasia Insight article “Some in Georgia Worry that the Russian Base Withdrawal Deal Comes 
with a Catch” by Molly Corso dated 1 Jun 05. 
54 
and their presence was an irritant to Russian-Georgian relations.140  Analysts argue that 
Russia’s reluctance to close the bases represents a Cold War mentality that equates 
military bases with influence.  According to this view “Georgia remained part of Russia’s 
‘sphere of influence’ as long as military bases remained there… [and] withdrawal of 
bases equals irrevocable ‘loss’ of a country.”141  A more contemporary view is that 
military bases are the result of influence, not an instrument of influence.  Bases only have 
meaning “when the host country seeks security guarantees and wants military presence to 
solidify these guarantees and perhaps gain political and financial benefits. Bases 
established against the will of the host country are seen as a symbol of occupation and 
hostile control.”142  In this regard, Russia’s policy more closely resembles a Balancer 
approach versus a pragmatic Great Power Normalizer approach. 
c. Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Part of Georgian President Saakashvili’s mandate following the “Rose 
revolution” was to restore the nation’s territorial integrity by bringing Georgia’s three 
break-away regions, Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, back under Tbilisi’s control.  
(For background information on the internal or “frozen conflicts” in Georgia see Annex 
A.)  With Moscow’s help, Saakashvili succeeded in wresting control from Ajaria’s 
authoritarian leader in May of 2004, but his August 2004 effort to crack down on illegal 
activity in South Ossetia failed and peaceful settlements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
have eluded him.   Despite repeated efforts to bring the two regions back in line with 
promises that they would be written into the constitution with “the broadest conceivable 
autonomy within a unitary Georgian state,” progress has not been made and the 
President’s offers have been repeatedly rejected.  Georgia argues that this is due to 
Russia’s tacit willingness to maintain the status quo in the republics.   
Russia-Georgian relations since 2005 have been characterized by 
increasingly vitriolic rhetoric between Moscow and Tbilisi with Georgia seeking greater 
involvement of the international community in resolution of the conflicts.  Russia’s 
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position on the issue has largely been viewed as obstructionist and characterized by Great 
Power Balancer thinking.  In late 2004, despite Moscow’s financial backing and 
involvement of Russian spin doctors, the candidate supported by the Kremlin suffered a 
humiliating electoral defeat in Abkhazia’s presidential election and Sergei Bagapsh, seen 
as pro-Georgian, won the office. 143  Russia then orchestrated a new election that saddled 
Bagapsh with his former opponent, now listed as Vice President, on a joint ticket. 144  
On the heels of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution,” this clumsy effort to 
“manage” an election was seen as another Kremlin orchestrated foreign policy disaster.  
Russian critics cited Moscow’s old-school approach to diplomacy within the former 
Soviet Union-- one where Kremlin pundits automatically back the ruling clans in 
elections without account for the nuances of local conditions -- as the source of failure.  
In the case of Abkhazia, Moscow’s preferred candidate was from one of the region’s 
toughest anti-Georgian clans and was unlikely to cooperate in any meaningful future 
attempts at political settlement.145  A brief rapprochement with Tbilisi followed, and 
Tbilisi unveiled a peace plan, only to be set back by numerous security issues in the 
breakaway region during 2005.146  A Georgian foreign ministry statement followed, 
criticizing Russian peacekeeping forces in the territory for allegedly ignoring violence 
targeted at Abkhazia’s ethnic Georgian community.   
In South Ossetia, a new “demilitarization” policy was instituted in 
November 2004, despite continued allegations by Georgian officials that Russia was 
                                                 
143 Steven Eke, “Russia twice shy in Abkhazia.” BBC News article, Wednesday, 12 January 2005, 
12:00 GMT. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4167539.stm (accessed December 
2005) and “New Leader Announced in Abkhazia,” BBC News article, Thursday, 13 January, 2005, 14:09 
GMT.  Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4171153.stm (accessed December 
2005). 
144 Cory Welt, “Realism, Russia, and Conflict Resolution,” PONARS Policy Memo 348, November 
2004, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  Online at 
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,1976/  (accessed February 2005). 
145 Mikhail Delyagin, “From Global Controversies to Regional Conflicts,” Russia in Global Affairs 
no.1 (January-March 2005).  
146 In late 2005, Abkhazia announced it would no longer defer draft eligible Georgian men living 
within separatist-controlled territory from military service, a measure which led to the beating death of a 
Georgian resident of the Gali district after he refused to be conscripted into the Abkhazian army. The 
incident was followed only a few days later by the kidnapping of 68-year-old Georgian resident of Gali. 
Source: Liz Fuller, “Georgia: Can Moves Toward Abkhaz-Georgian Rapprochement Continue?“ RFE/RL 
article dated 14 August 2005. Online at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/4babf231-a1e4-4da8-
81f0-337461a28ac3.html (accessed December 2005). 
56 
providing arms and munitions to South Ossetian militia forces, who in turn were 
conducting raids on Georgian settlements.  The peace plan proposed by Tbilisi called for 
a three-phase approach to the conflict: demilitarization, economic development and then 
negotiation about the region’s political status.  South Ossetians claim they do not hold 
much promise in Georgia’s offers of “autonomy,” citing how the Georgian parliament in 
late 1990 “abolished with one stroke of the pen South Ossetia’s status as an autonomous 
oblast within Georgia, in direct violation of a pre-election pledge by then Georgian leader 
Gamsakhurdia.” 147  Complicating matters, Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh has stated 
that Abkhazia will withdraw from its own peace process with Georgia, and possibly 
provide aid to Tskhinvali, if war breaks out in South Ossetia. 148 Despite the sharp 
rhetoric however, both sides continued to destroy trenches and fortifications throughout 
2005 as specified by the demilitarization accord.  
In October of 2005, Tbilisi stepped up its efforts to gain international 
visibility and involvement in the conflicts.  In mid 2005, the promise of implementing a 
resolution to the conflicts seemed to gain momentum.  The new U.S. ambassador to 
Georgia, John Tefft, presented his credentials to President Saakashvili in late August 
2005, and expressed dissatisfaction with the existing mediation platform, implying that 
the Russia led negotiating format did not seem to be working and hinted that Washington 
was “interested in providing Russia with assistance in dealing with the many challenges it 
faces throughout the Caucasus region.” 149  While still pressing forward with the peace 
plans presented to the separatist regions, Georgia met the issue of Russian peacekeepers 
head on.   
On 11 October 2005 the Georgian parliament passed a unanimous 
resolution instructing the government to “take measures for the withdrawal of Russian 
peacekeeping forces,” in essence, have them declared illegal, “if their performance in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not improve before February and July 2006, 
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respectively.”  150  In late October, Georgia’s ambassador to the UN formally requested 
the Security Council to approve a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission for Abkhazia, 
arguing that the Russian peacekeeping force deployed under the auspices of the CIS is 
ineffective and accusing Russia of defacto "military annexation" of a part of its 
territory.151 The request is an unlikely prospect however, considering Russia’s Security 
Council veto power.   Criticism was further levied at Abkhazia’s refusal to grant the use 
of Georgian as the language of instruction in schools in Abkhazia's predominantly 
Georgian-populated Gali region.152   
On 27 October 2005, at a meeting of the OSCE in Vienna, Georgian Prime 
Minister Zurab Noghaideli unveiled a new three-part peace plan for the region.  The new 
plan calls for: OSCE, EU and US representatives to join Russia, Georgia and the 
Ossetians in mediating a settlement; further demilitarization of the conflict zone; and a 
donor-sponsored fund to rehabilitate the area.  The U.S. has welcomed the Georgian 
proposals, saying it is ready to help implement them and while the Georgian Foreign 
Minister Gela Bezhuashvili has denied that the plan seeks to sideline Russia, it is clear 
that Tbilisi would like more transparency and a breath of fresh air in the JCC.  Georgia 
was unable to “pitch” the peace plan at the 17 November 2005 CIS summit in St 
Petersburg however, because parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze boycotted the event as 
a result of Moscow failing to grant an entry visa to the Chairman of the parliament’s 
Defense and Security Committee in an apparent “blacklisting” move which could spark 
retaliation from Tbilisi.” 153  
On 19 November, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Georgia for 
the first time and President Saakashvili told journalists that Georgia was “extremely 
frustrated with the situation in Abkhazia,” citing the sale of property owned by former 
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Georgian residents, alleged daily violence against Georgians who have returned to 
Abkhazia, a reported build-up in arms in the breakaway territory and a refusal by 
Sokhumi to allow the opening of a UN / OSCE human rights office in the Gali district.154   
The visit was followed up on 6 December 2005 with a UN chaired a meeting in Abkhazia 
between Abkhaz and Georgian government officials, foreign ambassadors, and 
representatives of the European Commission and the UN’s Development Program.  The 
group met to discuss the first stage of a joint two-three year UN-EC program to 
rehabilitate the Abkhaz conflict zone and repatriate Georgians into the Gali district.    
On 30 November the Georgian Defense Ministry posted a new military 
strategy on its website which listed Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as threats to Georgia’s national security and cited the two remaining bases 
scheduled for closure as destabilizing elements.  The Russian Foreign Ministry responded 
by describing the claims as absurd, saying they were politically motivated in an attempt 
to shore up domestic support, identify a scapegoat for “Georgia’s political and economic 
failures,” and justify its “ever-increasing purchases of weapons and military 
equipment.”155  
The most surprising move related to the conflicts, and a strong signal that 
a thaw might have been at hand, at least in South Ossetia, was the announcement on 13 
December 2005 that the region’s self-styled President, Eduard Kokoiti, had submitted to 
President Saakashvili, President Putin and the OSCE Chairman, his own three phased 
peace plan that very closely resembles Tbilisi's.  While still wanting to keep negotiations 
within the JCC format, Kokoiti acknowledged greater OSCE participation and visibility 
into the negotiations.  The Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli credited Russian 
diplomacy and Moscow envoy Valeriy Kenyakin for the unexpected breakthrough.  The 
Georgian Minister of State for Regulation of Conflicts described Kokoiti’s initiative as a 
“brave step” and observed that is was the “first time that we have heard a ‘yes’ from 
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Tskhinvali to a project which we have elaborated in connection with the conflict.”156  
The Russian envoy reiterated that there was no need to broaden the JCC format as Tbilisi 
had suggested, citing that “the settlement of the conflict depends on the sides’ political 
will, not their number.”157 
The forward momentum Georgia seemed to have been building 
throughout 2005 came to an abrupt halt in 2006.  On the heels of the gas war at the turn 
of the year, Georgia suffered nearly a week long energy blackout when Russian gas 
supplies were interrupted by damaged pipelines Moscow claimed were caused by 
terrorist attacks.  Twin blasts in North Ossetia, across the Russian border from South 
Ossetia, effectively shut down the main pipeline that supplied Georgia with Russian gas 
during a brutal cold spell. The same day, electricity supplies to Georgia were interrupted 
following an explosion at a transmission tower on Russian territory. 158  Incensed over 
what they perceived as slow response to fix the pipeline or route gas to Georgia via an 
alternate pipeline running through Azerbaijan, Georgian officials  went so far as to accuse 
Russia of “engineering the explosions as a means of triggering a political crisis in 
Georgia,” statements the Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed as “hysterical.” 159  On 15 
February 2005, the Georgian parliaments unanimously passed a resolution calling for the 
removal of Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia. 160  A planned 20-21 February 
2006 meeting of the MCC to discuss details of the ongoing demilitarization process in 
South Ossetia, scheduled to take place in Vienna, was effectively cancelled when Russia 
at the last minute insisted the meeting be held in Moscow instead.  
With the withdrawal of regular military forces from the two remaining 
Soviet era bases all but inevitable, Russian peacekeepers remain Moscow’s only military 
mechanism of influence in Georgia and Russia will likely resist attempts to evict them or 
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change their composition. Georgia will probably continue to work toward this goal by 
continuing with efforts to increase international visibility into the “frozen conflicts,” a 
tactic that has generated success as evidenced by President Bush’s and UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan’s recent visits, as well as an EU pledge to provide 2 million euros 
($2.4 million) in aid to the victims of conflict in Abkhazia. 161  Russia in turn will likely 
continue pulling the strings behind the scenes, at least in South Ossetia, but may find that 
it has less influence in Abkhazia, especially if the West and UN continue to maintain a 
higher profile and Abkhazia sees the potential to gain financially by adopting a more 
accommodating attitude in discussions with Tbilisi.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Because Russia’s cultural influence on the Caucasus is weak, Moscow has to 
maximize its other mechanisms to achieve its desired outcomes in the region.  Efforts in 
the economic realm have yielded significant ties to the energy infrastructure of the 
Caucasian states but lack a real sense of cooperation and joint effort.  Georgia has been 
successful at diversifying its energy relationships through its cooperation with the 
Western backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and Baku-Erzerum gas pipeline.  
Such joint efforts with Russia however have not materialized, despite opportunities.  One 
potential project involved a proposed pipeline that would pass from the Russian port of 
Novorossiisk, along the Black Sea Coast, to Georgia via Abkhazia.  Such a venture 
would not only have alleviated the need to ship Russian oil via tanker through the 
congested Bosporus Straits taken but would have taken advantage of the excess capacity 
in the BTC pipeline as well – a win-win situation.  In addition, a lucrative economic 
development project such as a pipeline running through Abkhazia would have brought 
economic incentives to the peace process. ,162   
Russia’s most visible means of influence in Georgia continue to be manipulation 
of the frozen conflicts that lie within its borders.  In Georgia, Moscow’s patronage of the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia gives the Kremlin significant sway 
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during peace negations.  Tbilisi attempted to alter the equation by launching a diplomatic 
offensive in 2005, gaining greater visibility on the world scene with its attempts to 
internationalize its frozen conflicts.  In order not to damage its relations with the West, 
Russia may realize that it needs to show some forward progress or face the 
embarrassment of a Georgian campaign to evict its remaining military forces from their 
peacekeeping roles, which, were it ever to succeed, would eliminate a powerful 
mechanism of Russian influence in the region.  The process however, would likely be 
quite lengthy and in the meantime Moscow scuttle any progress in peace talks through its 
close ties with the leaders of the secessionist regions, leaving Georgia vulnerable to 
pressure from the Kremlin to be receptive to its policies. 
Georgia must remain realistic about its expectations concerning the peacekeepers. 
While the West may be willing to shed more light and transparency on fledgling peace 
processes, it will not likely commit to augmenting or replacing Russian peacekeeping 
troops.  OSCE or UN peacekeepers are a long shot, requiring Russia to withhold a veto. 
Tbilisi’s best chance of neutralizing this critical mechanism of Russian influence, is with 
a pledge from Ukraine and its friends in the GUAM and/or Community of Democratic 
Choice to replace evicted Russian peacekeepers with its own troops.  But first Georgia 
has to successfully engineer Russian removal of its peacekeeping forces. Some analysts 
argue that if Georgia unilaterally withdraws from the 1992 bilateral treaty between 
Moscow and Tbilisi that established the joint peacekeeping force, then the legal 
foundation for Russian troops in the breakaway province disappears.  Russia would be 
obligated by international law to withdraw its forces or be accused of aggression against 
Georgia.163     
Russia may have intended Georgia to become the 2005 poster child for how 
Moscow’s Great Normalization policy treats those former republics who choose to break 
ties with it.  Unlike a Balancer approach, which Tsygankov argues would result in 
sanctions, boycotts or even the risk of military conflict between Georgian and Russian 
forces in the conflict zones, Great Power Normalization behavior would simply freeze 
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Tbilisi out of Moscow’s circle of influence, for example through “indifference and 
market-based trade relations (including prices on oil, gas and energy) as well as a full-
scale visa regime (hurting Georgians who seek jobs in Russia.)”164   While those 
elements are present, Russia’s relations with Georgia are generally more characterized by 
conflict and distrust and Moscow frequently does not appear willing or able to alter their 
volatile nature.  Russia’s cooperation on significant movement forward toward resolution 
of the conflicts would make Moscow a hero and gain the Kremlin far more mileage with 
Tbilisi.  Pragmatism in this case should be pushing Russia to improve its relations with 
Georgia and form a partnership in energy and security.  Instead, Moscow’s relations with 
Tbilisi appear combative and mired in old school thinking. A Russian foreign policy 
analyst points out that Russia may be overstepping the line on imperial behavior.  
“Despite its drive to become the world’s energy superpower, Putin’s government, in the 
eyes of many Western observers, has exceeded the acceptable limit of authoritarianism 
and imperial foreign policy in the former Soviet Union.” 165  If Moscow proceeds along 
this path it may risk damaging the major tenet of its pragmatic foreign policy: cooperative 
economic and security relations with the West.   While the issue of Russian peacekeepers 
seems to particularly bring out Moscow’s worst tendency of looking at its Caucasus 
policies through a Great Power Balancer prism, one must also consider that its 
defensiveness on this issue is not entirely without merit when noting the advances the 
U.S. military has made in the region.   
Aside from its military presence through the Georgia Train and Equip program, a 
program whose limited duration seems to keep being extended, the U.S. has also made 
significant inroads in establishing military relations with Azerbaijan.  “Given the 
complicated situation in Iraq and Turkey’s cooling relations with the United States,” 
some Russian analysts predict that Azerbaijan could “hypothetically become an important 
base for a future operation against Iran.”166   A post 9/11 Department of Defense strategy 
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has been to move away from large formal bases that require a heavy logistical footprint, 
toward smaller forward operating locations known as “lily pads.” These “cooperative 
security locations,” are tactical facilities with pre-positioned stocks for quick access in 
support of contingency operations. 167  With expansion of the U.S. - Azerbaijan military 
to military relationship, and three visits by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the 
most recent in April 2005, Russia may be wondering whether Azerbaijan will become 
such an outpost.  Baku is already cooperating with Washington on another U.S. initiative 
that began in 2003, the Caspian Guard, a joint military effort that focuses on hydrocarbon 
security through maritime and border surveillance and patrol in the Caspian Sea 
region.168 
Moscow has attempted to counter these Western inroads, trying to draw 
Azerbaijan back into its orbit.  President Putin visited the state in February 2006, during 
which Russia “offered to act as a guarantor of peace in the event that Azerbaijan and 
Armenia reach a compromise over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 169   
Earlier in January 2005, during a trip to Azerbaijan, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov 
called for the creation of a Caspian naval force made up of forces from the five Caspian 
Sea littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) to counter 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other regional threats and 
challenges.170  In an ironic twist, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, during a 
working group meeting with Caspian states on regional problems, warned of the dangers 
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someone else's military presence in the Caspian region. Experience shows that it is easy 
to let foreign forces in while it is much more difficult to make them go out afterwards.” 
171 
Even seemingly unrelated events such as Moscow’s invitation to host Hamas 
leadership following their election to office in Palestine have regional repercussions.  
Russia's willingness to Hamas must not be looked at solely from an East-West 
perspective, as evidence that Russia is trying to undermine or counterbalance the 
positions of the U.S. and EU.  Russia's decision to establish a dialogue with Hamas 
stands to benefit its internal security with respect to militant Islamic groups in 
Chechnya.   Already dissatisfied by the willingness of Hamas to accept Russia's 
invitation for talks, the separatist Chechen government was further outraged following a 
press conference given by Hamas political director Khaled Mashaal in Moscow on 3 
March 2006.   When asked by Russian journalists to address the situation in Chechnya, 
Mashaal replied, "This is an internal issue for the Russian Federation.  We do not involve 
ourselves in the internal affairs of other nations." 172   
The failure of Hamas to acknowledge the Chechen conflict as part of the greater 
Islamic struggle against oppression was a victory for Moscow and a slap in the face of the 
separatist government, whose information agency responded with harsh words.  An 
editorial stated "it was certainly worth it for the butchers of the Chechen nation to extend 
a hand to Hamas, given how readily they seized it, ran off to Moscow, and kissed the 
drunken faces of our murderers.  What lower scum could there be than a Muslim who 
refuses to recognize the genocide of the Chechen people?"  Negative views such as this 
demonstrate fissures among elements of the global jihad that Russia can exploit.  
Chechen solidarity with Palestinian militant groups (including Hamas) has been a fixture 
of the separatist government's policy since its creation in 1997, and plays a key role in its 
radical Islam propaganda, international recruitment, and funding efforts.  A break in unity 
with other jihadist movements could undermine efforts of Chechen radicals trying to 
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"transform regional dissatisfaction with Moscow into the political and theological basis 
for jihad against Russian federal authorities throughout the North Caucasus.”173      
Viewed in isolation, Russia’s courting of Azerbaijan in an attempt to shore up 
relations in the Caucasus is a perfect example of Great Power Normalization.  Despite the 
fact that Baku has generally been wary of Russia due to its role as Armenia’s security 
ally, and Azerbaijan has reached out to the West with energy projects such as the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzerum gas pipeline, relations with Moscow 
have been fairly good, compared with Georgia.  Trade between the two countries has 
reached an all-time high and President Putin made a point to congratulate President 
Aliyev on his country’s recent successful parliamentary elections which resulted in pro-
government force taking nearly half the legislative seats (a pointed divergence from 
OSCE and EU criticism over voting irregularities and the use of police force to break up 
an approved demonstration staged by the opposition.) 174  When viewed in the larger 
context of the Caucasus, it begins to take on some Great Power Balancing elements.  
Absent is evidence of cooperation with the West on economic and security issues, despite 
a plethora of opportunities such as a Russian oil pipeline through Georgia that feeds into 
the BTC, a Russian led effort to break through the morass of Georgia’s frozen conflicts, 
and a joint effort in security of the Caspian basin.  Instead, Moscow’s approach to the 
region gives a sense that Russia is more or less trying to counter Western military and 
economic presence with its own initiatives such as the Caspian force and a relentless 
effort at maintaining the status quo of Georgia’s internal conflicts.   
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IV. UZBEKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA - ROAD TO REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION OR SHADES OF NEO-IMPERIALISM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 2 February 2006, U.S. National Intelligence Director John Negroponte briefed 
the Senate Intelligence Committee on the vulnerability of Central Asia.  He warned that 
"Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, 
widespread poverty and widening socioeconomic inequalities, and other problems that 
nurture nascent radical sentiment and terrorism."175    The strategic importance of Central 
Asia, not only for efforts to combat global terrorism, but also for ensuring the 
uninterrupted flow of natural resources that drive Western economies, requires us to 
understand the dynamics that drive the region, especially the role that an increasingly 
assertive Russia plays.   
This region was selected as a case study because of its strategic importance to 
Russia, not just as a source of energy, but also a source of concern.   Moscow fears the 
region’s capacity to breed Islamic extremism and recognizes that its highly permeable 
borders make Russia vulnerable to drug traffickers and terrorists transiting from Central 
and South Asia.  Within the region, Uzbekistan is highlighted for emphasis because of its 
post Soviet attempt to distance itself from Moscow and pursue a more independent and 
multi-vectored foreign policy, making it a good litmus test for the effectiveness of 
Russia’s mechanisms of influence.  The case study begins with a survey of Russia’s 
strategic interests in Central Asia followed by the diplomatic, information/cultural, 
military and economic (DIME) analysis developed in Chapter II. 
While Russia’s relationship with westward-leaning neighbors such as Ukraine and 
Georgia grew increasingly tense in 2005, Moscow appeared to be consolidating its 
position and influence in Central Asia, particularly in historically neutral Uzbekistan.  
Analysis of Russia’s informational and cultural impact on Central Asia finds that Russian 
cultural resources play a far more significant role there than in the Caucasus.  A review of 
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Russia’s diplomacy in the region finds Russia distancing itself from Western criticism of 
the region’s authoritarian regimes and instead actively offering political support and 
promoting a status quo.  Moscow has an aggressive energy agenda and has increased 
emphasis on military mechanisms of influence, seeking to intensify coalition-based 
efforts to respond to regional threats.  The year 2005 was not just significant for the 
expulsion of U.S. military forces from Uzbekistan but also for Moscow’s new security 
pact with Tashkent, and more solidified military postures in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Analysis of all four of these factors--cultural, diplomatic-political, military-security, and 
economic--reveals that Russia has been extremely successful in waging a multi-
dimensional geopolitical offensive in Central Asia. While its initiatives largely meet the 
tenets of Great Power Normalization, the depth and breadth of its penetration of the 
region’s energy infrastructure is disconcerting and suggests that Russia may be able to 
exert undue influence on the countries’ policy making processes by using energy as a 
lever.  Evidence of such a potential includes Tajikistan’s announcement of a formalized 
military base deal with Russia following an influx of Russian investment and 
Uzbekistan’s announcement of a strategic alliance following similar investment 
initiatives by Moscow.  How much influence is too much to accord with a policy of Great 
Power Normalization rather than a policy of balancing the United States or neo-
imperialism?   
B. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
In the late 1990s three armed conflicts took place in the region.  The Taliban 
regime had consolidated its position in most of Afghanistan and was fighting an 
ethnically and religiously disparate group of rebels (the Northern Alliance) for control of 
remaining Afghan territory.  Second, Islamist rebels based in Afghanistan had been trying 
to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan, and armed incursions frequently spilled over 
into neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Third, while the peace process between 
Islamic rebels and Tajikistan’s communist regime had largely been completed, some 
armed groups continued the rebellion from rebel-controlled parts of the country or border 
regions of Uzbekistan.176   
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Such instability on Russia’s doorstep is one of Moscow’s worst nightmares. Its 
strategic interests in Central Asia are aimed at mitigating and containing it, not just to 
protect the southern flank, but also to create conditions favorable to economic growth, 
especially in the energy sector.  What Russia wants is access to the region’s energy 
resources, and what it needs is regional stability to get them.  These mutually supporting 
interests are explained below to provide a contextual understanding of what motivates 
Russia in its foreign policy in Central Asia.  The case study then turns to the DIME 
analysis evaluating specific elements of influence at work in the region.  
1.  Controlling and Mitigating Regional Instability 
A new Russian security doctrine began evolving in the mid-1990s that reflected 
less of a preoccupation with “traditional” Cold War threats and more with regional 
threats rooted in instability and turmoil along Russia’s southern border.  Former Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeev in 1998 noted that the possible escalation of armed conflicts aimed 
at strengthening the position of Islamic extremism in the Caucasus and Central Asia were 
a very real and serious threat to Russia.177  Moscow’s “domino theory” holds that Islamic 
extremism could spread from Central Asia to the Caucasus or vice versa and into Russian 
Muslim regions such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  It is this type of alarmist thinking 
that contributed to Russian military efforts to prop up Tajikistan’s communist 
government in the wake of a civil war with Islamic political factions in the mid- to late 
1990s, a regional precedent that could be repeated.   
Unlike the dubious and overstated claims that Islamic extremism is at the root of 
Russia’s problems in Chechnya,  Central Asia has been victim to militant Islam, namely 
at the hands of the groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU).  While a relatively short historical tradition of secular governance 
exists, Central Asia is facing a rising Islamic extremist element, largely fueled by the 
abject poverty of all but the ruling elite in the region.  Existing authoritarian regimes 
repress any Islamist elements. Regional experts caution that these efforts to control 
political Islam could eventually backfire, as lack of political freedoms drive people to 
join radical groups. "The enormous repression of the Central Asian regimes and the lack 
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of any kind of political expression naturally forces politically oriented people to go 
underground and to become radicalized, and then join these Islamist groups".178  
Another critical component of regional stability is curbing the operations of 
criminal networks engaged in drug, arms and human trafficking.   Like Russia’s earlier 
shift in threat perception from the Western to the South, Moscow has also begun to define 
its security threats in a broader manner, rather than in strictly in conventional military 
terms.  As Gail Lapidus noted in 2001, 
increasingly, the flows of weapons, of drugs, of refugees, and of Islamist 
radicalism and terrorism came to be viewed as major new threats to 
security. The drug trade took on particular importance because of its role 
in financing civil wars and insurgencies across the entire region, beginning 
with the civil war in Tajikistan and extending to the rise of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. 179 
In Central Asia links can be drawn between Islamic terrorism and the illicit drug trade, 
and the region comprises the main transit corridor for illicit drugs from Afghanistan to 
Russia.  
As a result, during the 1990s Russia had hopes of maintaining key installations 
and military facilities throughout the former Soviet republics in order to maintain an 
outer defense of CIS borders, sharing this task with other CIS member-states to form a 
“forward security zone,” and outer perimeter that would act as a security buffer for 
Russia.  The fiscal realities of the late 1990s made this impossible as Russia lacked the 
personnel to occupy the bases, and the financial means to support the requirements of 
joint operational tasks with the CIS states.180   For the most part, Central Asian states, as 
well as Russia, are limited in the resources they can put toward this problem and the best 
approach appears to be regional cooperation.  The most significant contribution Moscow 
can make, now that it no longer provides border guards along Tajikistan’s border with 
Afghanistan, is “increased access to Russian security agencies” and diversification of 
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“existing anti-drug security structures on a CIS scale.”181  Such measures are cheap and 
reliable alternative to deeper regional involvement with Western countries or Western 
multilateral security organizations.    
2. Economic Presence and Expansion 
The mainstay of President Putin’s Global Power Normalization foreign policy 
was Russia’s economic expansion.  For Central Asia this meant that the Russian ruble 
and business community, particularly its energy sector, would play a dominant role in the 
region.  Under President Putin there is now a “growing recognition in the Foreign 
Ministry and in the Economic Development and trade ministry that they need to support 
Russian businesses abroad.”182  Upon taking office in 2000, in his first Security Council 
speech, Putin declared the Caspian Sea region a “zone of vital interest.” He blamed 
increased Western and Turkish presence on Russian “inactivity” and urged Russian 
companies to “engage in more competition.”183   
While Russia may not possess the most advanced technology in the global energy 
market, the existing Soviet infrastructure still in place gives Russia a significant 
comparative advantage in its relations with the Central Asian states due to “dependency 
linkages” that Russia can exploit.  The region under Soviet control was primarily a source 
of raw materials and few states have the processing or manufacturing infrastructure to 
produce finished goods, which were usually produced in Russia.184  It is far cheaper to 
repair these industrial links by exporting raw materials to Russia than to construct them 
domestically.  In addition, Soviet era pipelines were all constructed to run back to Russia 
rather than export oil and gas directly to destinations beyond the USSR.   
Owing to President Putin’s efforts to regain an element of control over the state’s 
energy monopolies, there now exists a much greater level of coherence and coordination 
in Russian foreign economic engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with 
overlapping interests between the state and “big business.” This enables Moscow to 
exercise a foreign policy where “the states of the region remain dependent on Russian                                                  
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energy imports or on the Russian pipeline system… [and] remain within the sphere of 
influence of the Russian state and Russian energy companies.” 185    
Between the security and economic imperatives described above, a symbiotic 
relationship seems to be taking place where investment in energy resources and 
infrastructure naturally leads to a need to protect that infrastructure.  This facilitates 
bilateral or coalition-based efforts to secure the Caspian Sea basin from perceived threats.  
Another example of symbiosis concerns Russia’s arms trade with the region.  Central 
Asian states are highly dependent on Russian military hardware and its spare parts supply 
chain for their legacy equipment, a need Russian arms manufacturers are happy to 
meet.186  Great Power Normalizers seek to maximize these types of linkages, stressing 
their mutual benefit. 
C. RUSSIAN MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE: EFFORTS TO USE 
DIPLOMACY, INFORMATION, SECURITY AND ECONOMICS TO 
ACHIEVE ITS INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA. 
When the Soviet Union dissolved and Russian President Yeltsin proposed the 
hastily created Commonwealth of Independent States, he originally intended the new 
union to only be composed of the Slavic republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus—the 
original signatories who formed the CIS during a meeting near Minsk 7-8 December 
1991.  Central Asian leaders however, most notably Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
were furious at being excluded and a subsequent treaty that added eight additional 
republics was concluded in Alma Ata on 21 December 1991.187   Uzbekistan pursued an 
independent foreign policy and Turkmenistan one of isolation. However, the other three 
former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, formed the nucleus of 
the “unionist” group within the CIS, seeking closer economic and military integration 
with Russia.   
Sharing more of a kinship with the Middle East than its Central Asian neighbors, 
Uzbekistan, under the leadership of Islam Karimov, has long harbored its own aspirations 
as a regional hegemon. Uzbekistan is the most populous of the Central Asia states and 
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home of the region’s largest ethnic group, the Uzbeks.  The country is unique among its 
neighbors because its titular ethnic majority bears a strong cultural identity that dates 
back to the Turkic-Mongol empire and the sophisticated Silk Road cities of Bokhara, 
Samarkand and Khiva.188  Upon first gaining its independence, Uzbekistan, which had 
largely been a natural gas producer for the Soviet Union, had not yet discovered its own 
substantial oil reserves.  President Karimov embarked on a vigorous program to build the 
infrastructure necessary to process his own oil and by 1996 the country was self-
sufficient in energy. 189 This is one of the primary factors that allowed Tashkent to 
pursue an independent foreign policy not limited by Moscow’s influence.     
1. Information / Cultural Mechanisms of Russian Influence 
In general Russia’s perceptions of its imperial and Soviet past have differed from 
those of the USSR’s other constituent republics.  Russians generally believe that during 
the tsarist and Soviet period they were a civilizing force that enriched the people who 
were incorporated (willingly or unwillingly) into the Russian empire.  In turn they feel 
the Soviet empire exploited Russia, in essence robbing from the rich center and giving to 
the poor periphery.  This perception is largely at odds with that of other nationalities, for 
whom Russia was inextricably associated with Soviet power and with their own lack of 
freedom.   
In Central Asia, although the popular consensus on the benefits of Russian 
imperialism is mixed, the imprint left by Moscow is deep.  While Russia is seen as an 
oppressor, especially with regard to its role in suppressing Islam, it is also seen as a 
protector and benefactor.  Many Central Asians feel that without Russian/Soviet 
involvement, they would be another Afghanistan, a political and economic basket 
case.190   Insulated from much of the Western world due to geography and then Soviet 
oppression, Central Asia in the last century seems to have grown up in a vacuum, with its  
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primary cultural exposure being Soviet/Russian.  Pre-Soviet and indigenous conceptions 
of identity (with some exceptions, such as the Uzbeks) is generally less well formed than 
in the Caucasus. 191   
The magnitude of this imperial legacy has been perpetuated by the fact that so 
little outside light was shed on the region even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The urban intelligentsia tended to be more “Russified” than in the Caucasus and played a 
greater role in intellectual and cultural life.192  State actors who exercised power after the 
collapse were the same ones who wielded it before;  because they were able to “maintain 
or expand their power base after independence through their privileged access to scarce 
resources and control over distribution networks,” very little turnover occurred that 
challenged the status quo.193  Compounding the lack of well-developed national identities 
or even the unifying force of Islam, which had been driven underground, Central Asian 
states have not had the opportunity to even begin developing a strong civil society.194  
With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, existing “legacy” regimes in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were able to consolidate their authoritarian hold on the 
instruments of state power, leaving no autonomous sphere where opposition could be 
voiced or societal interests articulated.   
Unlike in most other former Soviet republics, in Central Asia, there is very little 
indigenous free press and many residents listen to government-controlled or Russian 
media, making their view of regional politics somewhat “Moscow-centric.”195  In the 
2005 Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index, out of 167 countries surveyed, 
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none of the Central Asia states appeared in the top 100. Kyrgyzstan ranked highest at 
111th, followed by Tajikistan at 113, Kazakhstan at 119 and Uzbekistan at 155, with 
Turkmenistan ranking 165. Only Eritrea and North Korea ranked lower.   
The Russian language is still widely spoken, especially in academic, political and 
business circles, and serves as the common denominator in educated discourse, further 
impeding a sense of independence from Moscow. 196  This is the case not just for the 
states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which have significant ethnic Russian minorities, 
but even in those where Russians make up only 5-10% of the population.  Like their 
borders, the Central Asian republics’ titular languages were artificial creations, and with 
constantly changing alphabets, were in essence dysfunctional.  In comparison, even in 
ethnically diverse states like Georgia, in the Caucasus, only about 10% of residents speak 
Russian.  In addition, significant Russia minorities still live in several of the Central 
Asian republics and millions of Central Asians live and work in Russia, perpetuating a 
social milieu in which it is easier to navigate in the Russian language.197   
Perhaps realizing what an advantage this gives it, Russia is tapping into its soft 
power to counter perceived Western NGOs efforts to promote national languages and the 
use of English as the new language of international communication in post-Soviet states.   
In January 2005, Foreign Minister Lavrov called for Russian NGOs to play a greater role 
in improving the country’s image in the world and went so far as to offer NGOs the use 
of 43 Russian cultural centers functioning in 38 countries around the globe.  With regard 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States he stated that, "Russian non-government 
organizations in the CIS can engage in versatile activities from monitoring elections and 
assisting conflict prevention using people's diplomacy to protecting the rights of ethnic 
Russians and helping CIS immigrants adapt to a life in Russia.”198  An expanded 
dialogue with CIS countries through NGOs, he continued, would “prop up the 
commonwealth, promote the implementation of numerous CIS agreements, and still more 
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important, it would disrupt attempts to drive a wedge between Russia and its closest 
neighbors.”199  In addition, the Kremlin has recently proposed that the free education 
quota for students from the CIS (currently set at 1%) should be increased, allowing more 
students from the CIS to get a free education in Russia's higher educational 
establishments. President Putin also spoke out against cutting the number of departments 
which Russian colleges and universities have in the CIS and announcing that Moscow 
State University is expanding its network of branches in the CIS, an effort the Russian 
leadership will facilitate.200    
Efforts such as these are consistent with Tsygankov’s Great Power Normalization 
model in that through soft power, Russia is trying to make itself better understood and 
more influential among its neighbors.  It is likely that Russia would not be nearly as 
successful in wielding its diplomatic, economic and military mechanisms of influence in 
Central Asia without sharing some common cultural foundations with the region.   
2. Political Mechanisms of Russian Influence 
Despite being the dominant actor in the region for much of the 1990s, Russia was 
challenged at the turn of the millennium by the shake up in global affairs that followed 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.  The U.S. courted regional 
leaders (with Russia’s pragmatic consent) and obtained a territorial foothold that Russia 
continued to watch with a wary eye.  In addition, Moscow was faced with managing 
newfound Chinese economic interests in the region as well.  The dual-track strategy  of 
diplomatic support of the political status quo and political efforts to mitigate United 
States goals of democracy-promotion has been Russia’s most potent political mechanism 
in the region. 
a. Support for a Non-Democratic Political Status Quo 
Among the region’s authoritarian regimes, where “revolution” phobia is 
perhaps at its peak, Russia’s tolerance of regional human rights abuses and authoritarian 
measures makes it highly attractive as an ally.  The republics share suspicion of efforts of 
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IGOs and NGOs to build democracy, frequently telling the West that there are different 
paths to democracy, and “democracy” in one country can be different from another.  
Many Central Asian officials believe that the Bush administration’s aggressive 
democratization policies have helped foment political upheaval in the former Soviet 
Union, leading to regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Incumbents 
throughout Central Asia are now intent on preventing the revolutionary turmoil that 
engulfed Kyrgyzstan in the Tulip revolution from spreading to its neighbors.  This 
acceptance of the status quo gives Russia an edge in its efforts to appeal to Central Asian 
regimes.  “The US cannot compete with Russia and China in that kind of a Great Game 
because its domestic political culture and circumstances require it to pay attention to 
human rights and economic transparency in a way that Russia and China don’t have to 
do.” 201  Following the U.S. led Iraqi war, Moscow was able to capitalize on the region’s 
concern over President Bush’s crusade for democracy and its relative disappointment 
with what they expected to be a post-9/11 financial windfall.   
Overall the Central Asian republics expected more from their support of 
the US-led global war on terrorism (GWOT) in Afghanistan.  For example, the United 
States kept its involvement with Uzbekistan limited to the security realm and GWOT, 
concentrating its efforts at Karshi-Khanabad airbase, which it used for American 
operations in Afghanistan. No significant economic involvement tied the countries closer 
together. making the President of Uzbekistan’s decision to expel American forces 
relatively simple.202  Overall, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan expected far greater 
increases in foreign assistance packages and “fast track” upgrades of military and security 
forces, while Washington envisioned incremental reforms with local funding.203  In 
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addition, as the strategic importance of Central Asian bases waned in light of the Iraq 
war, the US could afford to be more diplomatically standoffish.       
Neither Russia nor the Central Asian states were prepared for the U.S. 
ousting of Saddam Hussein.  The Bush administration’s rhetoric about supporting 
democracy around the globe and “freeing the world’s citizens from tyranny” hit a little 
too close to home for many of their authoritarian regimes.   During his second inaugural 
address President Bush announced that democracy was the country’s central principle 
with respect to foreign policy.  This was reinforced by statements from Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Daniel 
Fried: state security and U.S. interests in democracy are indivisible.204  The implication 
was that no longer would the U.S. turn a blind eye to civil rights abuses in the interest of 
joint counterterrorism activities.    
One week after Condoleezza Rice left Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
conspicuously absent from her 10-13 October 2005 tour of Afghanistan and Central Asia, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited both countries on 21 October 2005.   
Lavrov’s efforts can be interpreted as “mop-up” operations, a clear sign of Russian 
willingness to side with Central Asian regimes and to reject U.S. efforts to stigmatize 
them on the basis of their democratic credentials.  After meeting with Uzbek President 
Islam Karimov and Foreign Minister Elyur Ganiev in Tashkent, Lavrov announced that 
the two countries were "united by the need to fight the threats of extremism and 
terrorism” and said they have good prospects for developing bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation.205  The visit was on the heels of a stop in Ashgabat. There Russia’s Foreign 
Minister discussed with Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov the formation of a 
joint naval force to patrol the Caspian Sea (despite the fact that Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran all claim shares of the resource-rich Caspian and 
have not yet agreed on a final settlement that would delineate their shares and rights).    
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In the wake of the Andijon massacre in Uzbekistan, Russia demonstrated 
that it is more than happy to come to the aid of the Karimov regime, standing by it in the 
wake of Western criticism, in order to further Russian foreign policy objectives.  Senior 
Russian officials, including Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov  
went so far as to defend Karimov’s government and blame the Andijon violence on 
“external sources,” implying that Islamic extremists were responsible for agitating the 
situation in hopes of bringing down the government.  Another important benefit for 
Russia of maintaining the status quo in Central Asia is preservation of Moscow’s 
business ties, frequently based on clannish relationships among political elites, discussed 
next.     
3. Economic Mechanisms of Russian Influence 
Rather than fostering greater integration, the end of the Cold War and the forces 
of globalization, have had a destabilizing impact in the former Soviet republics. As 
described earlier, economic integration among the former Soviet republics failed due to 
ideological cleavages, differing levels of economic development among its members and 
protectionist trade policies.  Ironically, Russia was one of the worst offenders. Early on it 
refuse to maintain the Russian ruble as the currency in use among CIS members. Its 
protectionist stance toward CIS imports in some cases pushed CIS states into the global 
economy rather than deeper into a Russian-dominated trade bloc in which Russia would 
only trade on favorable terms.  Despite difficulties within the CIS, Russia initially did not 
want to see alternative regional sub-groups emerge, for fear they would cut Moscow out 
of the picture.  In recent years however, as long as Russia can be a part of smaller sub-
groups and ensure that they do not undermine Moscow policies, they have been 
encouraged and are a major characteristic of a policy of Great Power Normalization.   
Many of the new states are still too weak economically and institutionally to 
effectively integrate into highly competitive global markets.  They are therefore highly 
dependent on close economic ties to Moscow, especially in the energy sector and this 
makes regional integration (even under Moscow’s leadership) still desirable to some.  
This makes them more amenable to Moscow’s leadership role.  The two primary trends 
in the area of economics that have emerged under President Putin’s Normalizer foreign 
policy are regional integration efforts and the dominance of energy politics. 
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a. Regional Economic Integration 
Integration efforts among CIS states generally can be categorized as either 
broad-based and sub-regional.  Broad-based integration usually included a political 
component while sub-regional efforts were targeted to specific projects.  Russia, on one 
hand has “consistently sought to transform the CIS into a full-fledged military and 
political group under its leadership.”206  Most of the smaller members favored sub-
regional groupings that allowed those with like needs and interests to work toward 
common goals.  It is therefore with some surprise that Russia policy experts have noted 
Moscow’s newfound interest in forming regional clubs:  
Generally, Moscow has little enthusiasm for international organizations, 
particularly for European fora like the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, and is quite 
content with the unreformed United Nations Security Council. In Central 
Asia, however, Putin finds it important to formalize his personal networks 
with regional leaders, which he has been cultivating incessantly, into 
organizational frameworks.207   
One such organizational framework is the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC or 
Eurasec).  The troubled integration efforts of the CIS led “unionist” countries to band 
together in smaller groups that had more similar goals.   
Eurasec was formalized in 2000 and championed by Kazakhstan’s 
President Nazarbaev who became chairman in 2001.  The group was actually a club 
within a club, uniting together the CIS “unionists” from the original Customs Union 
(Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) with a new pledge to 
simply observe the provisions of the CIS agreements already in place.  Nazarbaev’s 
brainchild, the group was intended to move toward ASEAN- or NAFTA-style 
agreements. It was also designed to gain recognition at the UN as an international 
organization and therefore have some negotiating power in respect to other international 
organizations.  In addition, it differed from the CIS Customs Union in that it had greater 
enforcement powers and the ability to exclude members from the union for failing to 
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abide by its rules.  It had a weighted-voting and financing scheme with Russia picking up 
40% of the operating budget and a corresponding 40% of voting rights.  Agreement of 
2/3 of the membership was required on major policy issues which meant that Russia had 
to secure the votes of at least 2 other states to pass a policy, but it also meant sole Russain 
veto power.208 
Another major regional organization was the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO).  Formed in 1994 as an economic organization it was expanded in 
2001 to include political and security matters as well.  It was significant in that it 
included four of the five Central Asian states (minus Turkmenistan) but not Russia.  
While intended to improve broader regional cooperation in areas such as trade, the 
environment and transportation, common threats of insurgency and terrorism actually 
aggravated the members’ mutual distrust.209   Within the group cleavages formed 
between the countries closer to Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and more independent 
minded Uzbekistan, which the others perceived as trying to impose its own hegemony on 
the region.  Relations were further strained in 1999 and 2000 by internal instability in the 
Ferghana Valley. This led to mutual military incursions among the neighboring countries, 
as well as their tightening and mining of borders.  Despite these tensions, summits 
continued and a forum for dialogue on integration was maintained.   
The Unites States was a proponent of this regional integration, believing 
that the more the Central Asian states could leverage each other for cooperation, the less 
they would depend on Moscow.  Russia on the other hand never publicly encouraged the 
effort, and contributed to the lack of cohesion in the members’ goals and outlooks.210  
The invitation extended to Russia to join the group in 2004 was likely the harbinger of 
events to come as Russia signaled its renewed interest in Central Asia.   Russian 
membership changed the dynamics of the organization significantly.  No longer was it a 
“Central Asian club” where members were more or less on an equal footing. Some even 
                                                 
208 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst article “Eurasian Economic Community Comes into Being” by 
Roza Zhalimbetova and Gregory Gleason.  20 Jun 01 
209 Farkhad Tolipov, “CACO Merges with EEC: the Third Strike on Central Asia’s Independence,” 
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 October 2005. 
210 Farkhad Tolipov, “CACO Merges with EEC: the Third Strike on Central Asia’s Independence,” 
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 October 2005. 
82 
argue that Moscow’s membership “distorted the geographic configuration and natural 
political composition of Central Asia’s attempts at regional organization.”211   
During the 6 October 2005 CACO summit in St Petersburg, Russia, the 
group announced that it would merge with Eurasec.  Because of the overlapping nature of 
the organizations, the net effect of the merger was that Uzbekistan joined Eurasec, since 
the other CACO states were already members.  Significantly, this brought the previously 
independent-minded Uzbekistan into the “unionist” fold--a likely response to Tashkent’s 
feeling of international isolation following Western pressure in the wake of the Andijon 
crisis.   The leaders cited common objective between the organizations and elimination 
duplication of effort, time and money, as the reasons for the merger.212  Russian policy 
analysts observe that the event signals three main Russia intentions: to increase its 
influence in Central Asia, to improve cooperation in regional security, and to improve its 
position in channeling Russian direct investment into Central Asia, especially into the 
energy sector.  Overall, Western observers characterize the merger as the “third strike” 
for Central Asian independence and the ability of these states to mitigate Russian 
influence by coordinating a united front on issues of mutual interest.. 213    
b. Trade 
Aside from combating terrorism, the primary interest of the United States 
government in Central Asia has been democracy promotion through cultural exchange 
and educational activities.  Russia on the other hand has clearly asserted an economic 
presence.  Perhaps realizing that it should not be perceived as solely an energy exporter 
from the region, Moscow is also trying to tap into the burgeoning trade that is finally 
taking root in parts of the region.  The dismal statistics of the first post Soviet decade, 
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which saw CIS trade drop by 70%, have been halted.  Trade among the Eurasec bloc 
members in 2004 totaled $28 billion, up roughly 40% over the previous year.214   
Kazakhstan, which has the region’s strongest economy, has been Russia’s 
main focus. One of the efforts to strengthen ties among them is the creation of a regional 
investment bank with an initial capital supply of $1.5 billion, the bulk of it to be supplied 
by Russia. The bank will be headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan and is scheduled to 
open in December 2005.215  Kazakhstan’s share of Russian investment in the CIS has 
been increasing steadily, up from 2.6% in 2002, 5% in 2003 and 11.8 in 2004.  While 
other countries, such as Belarus, receive more Russian investment, their percentage of 
total investment has steadily declined, down from 58.9% in 2000 to 44.7% in 2003 and 
39% in 2004.  Also notable is Uzbekistan, which between 2000 and 2003 received less 
than 1% of the total investment Russia made in the CIS but in 2004 its share increased to 
19%, the highest of all the Central Asian states that year. 216  While Russia used to be the 
dominant trading partner of most Central Asian states, the percentage of trade with 
outside partners like the United States, Turkey, China and the EU have grown, and in 
some cases even replaced Russia as the leading trade partner and provider of technical 
assistance.217  Moscow’s newfound interest in regional economic organizations may be 
an attempt to recoup some of its trade losses with CIS partners, especially in Central 
Asia.. 
Efforts to stimulate Central Asian trade will be limited however by 
Russia’s most fundamental economic challenge: aging or insufficient infrastructure, a 
problem that grow more acute the farther east one travels.  Analysts observe that 
shortfalls in “tying together eastern, central and western Russia means that goods and 
services that go north–south to and from Russia and Central Asia, cannot easily be 
marketed in or shipped to Russia’s borders. Russia’s overall trade with Central Asia is 
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severely wounded from the outset.”218  The Putin administration has placed increased 
emphasis on developing Russia’s far eastern energy provinces in Siberia and Sakhalin 
and has visions of integrating them with transportation networks consisting of Sino–
Russian–American maritime transport projects, to include “tunnels from Japan to 
Sakhalin and then to Russia, or tunnels tying together Japan, South Korea and then the 
major Eurasian railways, projects with Southeast Asia, even discussions of Alaskan–
Russian tunnels that would connect with the tunnels to Southeast Asia.”219 Such 
grandiose plans seek to take advantage of Russia’s geographic bridge between Europe 
and Central, South and East Asia and attempt to compete with modern interpretations of 
the historic Great Silk Road(s) such as the EU’s TRACECA project that bypasses 
Russia.220  Only if Russia is successful in offering an alternative trade route will it 
successfully compete with the other rising powers that court Central Asian markets. 
c. Energy 
Analysts have observed Russia’s growing use of economic mechanisms to 
manifest its influence in the “near abroad” for some time; in 2003 they noted that Russian 
business executives were “acting as shock troops in the Kremlin’s latest bid to reestablish 
its controlling influence over former Soviet republics, confirming that economic 
considerations are exerting increasing influence over the policy-making establishment in 
Russia.” 221  That analysis was made in response to Russian policy in the Caucasus, but it 
predicted that if the strategy was successful, it would likely be used in Central Asia as 
well, an observation that has proved correct. 222    
Two years later, it appears that Russia is pursuing economic dominance in 
Central Asia via gas and hydroelectric power in particular.  Three trends have emerged in 
                                                 
218 Stephen Blank, “Infrastructural Policy in Central Asia.”  Central Asian Survey.  December 2004.  
p10. 
219 Ibid 
220 Ibid, 11.  For clarification, TRACECA is an EU sponsored project that seeks to promote 
sustainable regional development along a southern transportation corridor that links Europe to the Caucasus 
and Central Asia.   
221 Eurasia Insight article “Russia Seeks to Use Energy Abundance to Increase” by Igor Rokbakov, 
dated 19 Nov 03 
222 Russia’s electricity giant RAO – UES, in which, like Gazprom, the government has a controlling 
share, was able to secure large stakes in energy sectors in Armenia and Georgia (controlling 80% and 75% 
respectively of those states energy generating capacity).  Ibid.  
85 
Russia’s energy expansion strategy: monopoly over energy transportation systems that 
transit the region; acquisition of key energy infrastructure; and more active participation 
in resource extraction projects through direct financial investment. 223  In pursuit of these 
efforts, one of Russia’s most effective tools is the large amount of debt owed to Moscow 
by most of the CIS countries, totaling nearly $5B.224  Offering debt for equity swaps 
presents an attractive alternative to the poorest countries or those that owe the most.  The 
following section will examine Russia’s use of this strategy in the natural gas and 
electricity sectors. 
(1). Natural Gas:  While Caspian oil has received most of the 
energy attention in the region, its natural gas potential is generally more noteworthy.  
Regional proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), 
comparable to those in Saudi Arabia, while production in 2004 was approximately 5 Tcf, 
comparable to the combined production of South America, Central America, and Mexico. 
225  Because greater capital investment is necessary to finance new natural gas projects 
however, and the limitations of the existing infrastructure, oil has been the focus of most 
new foreign ventures.   Because  Russia’s own natural gas production has flat lined in the 
past several years, with major fields yielding less than they have in the past, Gazprom has 
turned to Central Asian supplies to make up the difference it needs for export (a cheaper 
short-term option than investing in the development of its own untapped Artic fields). 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the 2nd and 3rd largest natural gas 
producers on the Eurasian continent (Russia is the largest) but their large gas reserves are 
constrained by the lack of natural gas transport infrastructure, which forces them to rely 
on the Central Asia Center (CAC) main gas pipeline, which is where Russia enters the 
picture.  The CAC is the only major natural gas pipeline that connects to a larger 
distribution network, namely Russia’s, through which gas is transported to European 
customers.   
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Figure 1.   Central Asia Pipelines. (Energy Information Administration, US Dept. of 
Energy) 
 
Turkmenistan, Central Asia's primary gas exporter signed a deal 
with Gazprom in 2003, agreeing to a 25-year contract to sell all the gas it produces at 
discount price to Russia for export.  Russia uses part of the Turkmen gas domestically 
and sells the excess to Eastern Europe and CIS countries at a mark up.  Just over a year 
later however, volatile Turkmenistan leader Saparmurat Niyazov cut off supplies and 
tried to renegotiate more favorable terms. 226  When Moscow balked, Ukraine tried to cut 
the same deal, and capture the European market for itself, versus being merely a transit 
conduit for Gazprom’s export.  Newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko arranged a 
long term contract for Turkmenistan gas to be exported through Ukraine to Europe but 
Gazprom responded with a counter offer to Turkmenistan.  It insisted it would still pay 
the previously agreed upon discount price, but offered full payment in cash instead of a 
50% barter / cash split.  While Niyazov appeared eager to cash in on the European gas 
mark ups through higher purchase prices from Ukraine, he was forced to acknowledge 
that he first needed to consult with Russia.  Turkmenistan’s bargaining position with 
respect to securing higher prices for its gas is fundamentally weakened by its lack of 
export options. Except for one pipeline connecting Turkmenistan and Iran, the CAC that 
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runs through Russia is the country’s only way to export its natural gas, a point Niyazov 
was forced to concede when he stated that any deals with Ukraine can only be signed 
“when Russia gives its consent to pump the gas through its pipelines." 227   
While it is clear that Turkmenistan needs Russia, the relationship 
goes both ways.  Moscow has to make shoring up relations with Turkmenistan a priority 
for several reasons.  First, in order to maintain its export levels, it intends to keep its long-
term gas contracts with Turkmenistan in order.  Second, it needs a cooperative 
Turkmenistan to help repair its reputation following the messy winter 2005 / 2006 energy 
standoff with Ukraine.  The inability of the countries to come to an agreement on 2006 
gas rates resulted in a reduced volume of gas reaching Europe as Russia twice cut off its 
gas supply to Ukraine.   The disruption caused by the “gas war” has given the EU reason 
to question its heavy reliance on Russia as an energy supplier.228  Furthermore, 
Moscow’s game of hard-ball with Ukraine could have the inadvertent affect of causing 
Europe to seriously consider the financial viability of building of a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan that by-passes Russia and runs under the Caspian Sea and then through 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and into Europe," a venture that the US has long supported.  
229  The prospects of negotiating with the West on such a venture gives Niyazov a 
considerable bargaining chip with respect to any negotiations with Russia.  Turkmenistan 
has demonstrated its shopping around for other transit options as well, to include a 
pipeline through Iran to Turkey or through Afghanistan and Pakistan. 230  
Finally, Russia needs Turkmenistan on its side and not venturing 
westward (or becoming vulnerable to the revolution bug) in order to wrap up lingering 
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negotiations between the Caspian littoral states on the status of the seas’ energy 
resources. 231  While Russia and Kazakhstan have already delineated their interests and 
national as well as joint development zones, final adjudication between the remaining 
littoral states is hung up on the legal issue of whether the body of water is a lake or sea.  
That definition determines how maritime law is applied in dividing up Caspian Sea 
resources and determining transit rights.  A clear legal definition of such issues is critical 
for countries that want to traverse the Caspian with new pipelines, diversify their markets 
and liberate themselves from Russia’s existing, but aged energy transport 
infrastructure.232    
Russia is further solidifying its bargaining position with respect to 
Turkmenistan by launching joint gas ventures with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan in an apparent envelopment maneuver.  On 27 January 2006, Kyrgyz Prime 
Minister Kulov and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller announced that Russia would assist 
Kyrgyzstan in developing its energy potential and modernizing its production facilities 
through joint ventures that would invest “hundreds of millions of dollars to help 
Kyrgyzstan explore its oil and gas reserves.” 233  Several months earlier, in November 
2005, Gazprom signed a five year contract with Kazakhstan for gas transit.  The deal left 
Gazprom the sole operator for natural gas transport from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
via Kazakhstan and into Russia for sale to Europe.  In addition, a 2002 deal with 
Kazakhstan created a joint venture exporting Kazakhstan’s modest but growing natural  
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gas production northward to Russia.234  The implication of the 2005 deal is that “not a 
single meter of gas will be sold” on the European continent without Gazprom’s (and 
therefore Moscow’s) consent. 235   
Uzbekistan, which had previously focused on its domestic market 
and export to its neighbors, is now beginning to focus on development of more fields and 
improving its export infrastructure through cooperation with Gazprom.  It intends to 
supply Russia with 350 billion cubic feet per year by 2006.  On 20 October 2004, the 
economic adviser at the Russian Embassy in Uzbekistan announced that Russian 
companies would invest $2.099 billion in 37 projects in Uzbekistan; more than $2 billion 
of it was expected to go to the oil and gas complex.  This proclamation reflected the June 
2004 signing of 35-year production-sharing agreements between Uzbekistan and the 
Russian oil conglomerate LUKoil, worth $1 billion.  The effort will develop Uzbek 
natural gas deposits in the Bukhara-Khiva region.  LUKoil obtained a 90 percent share in 
the venture, with Uzbekneftegaz – an Uzbek state entity -- holding the remaining 10 
percent.  Gazprom announced in 2005 that it will start developing a $1.2 billion gas field 
in the Ustyurt region in Uzbekistan. and $15 million to extend the life of the Shakhpakhty 
gas field.236  Overall, through Gazprom, Russia will spend approximately $1.5 billion to 
modernize natural gas pipelines in Central Asian states to boost natural gas exports from 
the region.237   
Russia’s growing presence in Central Asia’s gas market will 
enable it to exert more pressure on Turkmenistan, forcing the enigmatic, “neutral” 
Niyazov to surrender more control over the marketing and development of his country’s 
gas industry to Moscow, especially as his isolation from the West grows and the 
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necessary foreign capital to develop alternate transshipment routes decreases due to 
Turkmenistan’s growing instability. 
(2) Electricity:  Just as Russia’s electricity giant RAO-UES 
was able to secure controlling interest in the state electricity sectors of several Caucasus 
countries several years ago, it has been aggressively following Gazprom’s lead in Central 
Asia (Gazprom owns a 10% share in the company).  Intent on using the region’s 
electricity to service its European markets, UES has targeted Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s 
hydroelectric industries.  Given that it has been managing the region’s Soviet era unified 
electrical grid, moving into production would be more efficient than building a new 
hydroelectric infrastructure in Siberia.238    
Notable recent efforts in Tajikistan apparently resulted from 
President Putin’s visit to Dushanbe in October 2004 which yielded a “comprehensive 
agreement involving a Russian exchange of Tajik sovereign debt for a surveillance 
facility, the establishment of a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan, and a 
RusAl [Russian Aluminum] commitment to undertake a multibillion-dollar project to 
build hydropower stations and aluminum-production facilities.” 239  Tajikistan has 4.4 
gigawatts (GWe) of generating capacity, about 90% of which is hydroelectric and a major 
portion of this hydroelectric capacity is used in aluminum production, which consumes 
40% of all the country's electric power. 240  To put the scale of this venture in 
perspective, RusAl’s proposed investment to modernize Tajikistan’s primary aluminum 
production plant (which ranges from $1.6B to $2B) is roughly half of Tajikistan’s GDP. 
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Russia would gain great influence in the republic with Kremlin-connected RusAl 
controlling Tajik aluminum-production facilities, power-generation facilities and access 
to a large pool of cheap labor.242   
Russian newspaper accounts in September 2005 speculated on a 
“grand plan” for increasing Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan, to include details such as 
the "gradual transfer of the Kyrgyz energy sector to Russian companies" and electricity 
giant RAO UES building two hydropower stations, “possibly with help from Russian 
Aluminum, which is seeking a convenient source of power for aluminum-production 
facilities it hopes to construct in Kyrgyzstan.” 243  In return Moscow would “write off 
half of Kyrgyzstan's $180 million Soviet-era debt and pass legislation to ease conditions 
for an estimated 300,000 Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia.”  No official confirmation 
of such a deal had been released by the end of the year, however, during a visit to 
Moscow in January 2006,  President Akaev told a Russian newspaper that Moscow plans 
to invest $2 billion in the Kyrgyz economy.   
Begging the question of whether the investment is a payoff for 
other Russian equities, the announcement was followed in February 2006 with Russian 
Air Force reports that Moscow planned to double the amount of equipment and 
personnel, at Kant Air Base (currently personnel levels are 500) by the end of the year.  
Another announcement followed stating “after consultations with the CSTO and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization [Kyrgyzstan] has decided against the deployment of 
U.S. AWACS surveillance aircraft at Manas.” 244 A side effect of these efforts is that 
with control of hydroelectric power, Russia will gain a voice in the management of the 
region’s water resources, which are still doled out through a Soviet era reservoir system 
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and managed through negotiated agreements.245  Having a tighter Russian led regional 
bloc with significant energy resources at its disposal will give Russia more say in this 
process, further leaving the Central Asian republics vulnerable to Moscow’s influence. 
d. Implications of Russia’s Economic Initiatives 
What are the implications of these economic initiatives in Central Asia?  
There can be no doubt that Russia has indeed made significant strides in increasing its 
influence in Central Asia through economic ties and initiatives.  Its efforts in this arena 
outpace any other efforts, including military, to establish influence.  In that regard 
Russia’s foreign policy complies with the tenets of Great Power Normalization.  Moscow 
has played to its advantages in the region.  Its Soviet era energy infrastructure has served 
to increase Kazakhstan’s, Uzbekistan’s and Turkmenistan’s dependence on Russian 
transit routes to reach external markets and Moscow has ensured long term cooperation 
through massive investment in their energy sectors.  Most importantly, unlike the United 
States and other Western countries, Russian investment will not be affected by 
irregularities or the absence of a Western-style tax structure and court system in the 
Central Asia states.  “Russian businesses and investment companies are familiar with the 
relative lawlessness in the former Soviet sphere, and are ready to enhance the Uzbek 
economy along with establishing a major Russian presence that will be extremely 
difficult to extract.” 246   
However, Russia must rely primarily on its export of raw materials and 
energy as mechanisms of economic influence in Central Asia for the foreseeable future, 
despite the small improvements in Central Asian economic integration and trade. Russia 
still faces significant challenges to its ability to use other economic resources to influence 
the region. These challenges arise from Russia’s own problems in completing domestic 
economic reforms. Central among them are anticorruption and judicial reform. Both are 
key in encouraging the domestic and foreign investment necessary to modernize Russia’s 
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infrastructure and allow Russian businesses to compete effectively in a climate of high 
speed, information technology-driven globalization.  
4. Security Mechanisms 
Russia’s most significant security meeans of influence in Central Asia has been its 
renewed military presence and commitment to regional security, accomplished through 
use of multilateral forums like the Collective Security Treaty Organization and bilateral 
security relationships with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and most recently Uzbekistan. In 
dealing with its security concerns, “Moscow is advocating the strengthening of collective 
security, and the creation through joint efforts of a reliable barrier on the path of the 
southern threats.”247 
a. Regional Security Integration 
Western experts generally perceive that the intent of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), formalized in 2003, is to serve as an alliance with 
a bloc structure and charter like NATO’s article V, which invokes mutual aid in the event 
of an attack on an alliance member. While seen in the West as Russia’s attempt to 
prevent NATO's further eastward expansion and keep some CIS countries under Russia's 
military protection, Moscow emphasized that the CSTO has an “open character and does 
not mean a military bloc of any kind.”  Nevertheless, “member states cannot join [other] 
military unions or take part in any kind of activity directed against another member state” 
according to former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. 248    
The organization is based on the Collective Security Treaty signed in 
Mary 1992 by former Soviet stakes seeking closer integration with Russia.  For Central 
Asia the implication was that these “unionists” were trying to surround wayward 
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to better keep them in line. 249  As with other CIS 
initiatives however, collective security efforts under the treaty suffered from the same 
incoherence and lack of follow through, despite being formed by “unionists” who were 
generally more favorably disposed to integration efforts.  Military integration among CIS 
states, like parallel economic efforts, was largely determined through bilateral versus 
multilateral efforts.  “Most CIS defense agreements have simply not been realized.  The 
numerous bilateral treaties Russia has signed with individual CIS states much better 
express common interests” than their multilateral commitments.250  Operationally, the 
only peacekeeping mission in the region which represented a broad, joint coalition with 
united interests took place in Tajikistan in 1992.  By 1998, Russia was effectively the 
only military contributor to the “collective” CIS peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan.251  
Organizationally, while it favored the concept of collective peacekeeping forces and 
sharing resources, the Russian Ministry of Defense routinely “rejected CIS staff 
proposals for supranational collective security bodies which might constrain Russian 
policy-making and prove costly for Russia.” 252 
The Collective Security Treaty Organization, established in 2003, was 
envisioned as a reinvigorated effort at joint security.  Its official objectives include 
ensuring peace, preserving the territorial integrity of member states countries, 
coordinating activities in the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking, and 
organized international crime, and providing immediate military assistance to a CSTO 
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member in the event of a military threat.253  While the previous Collective Security 
Treaty was regarded as a paper tiger, the CSTO’s formalization in 2003 signaled a 
commitment by members to put teeth to the entity by creating permanent institutions 
responsible for budget management and strategic military planning, with Russian officers 
taking the lead on the newly created CSTO staff. 254   
While the EEC/Eurasec organization gave Russia a lead in regional 
economic efforts, the CSTO tied Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan together under Russian leadership in the security realm.255   Both organizations 
attempt to reassert Moscow’s influence in Central Asia.  Both are headquartered in 
Russia and headed by retired Russian generals.  However unlike the EEC/Eurasec, where 
Moscow has an advantage in voting, CSTO decision-making is by consensus.  In 
addition, the Secretary General of the CSTO is a rotating three year position that will be 
vacated by Russia in 2006. 
Even without a Russian Secretary General, Moscow’s influence in the 
CSTO will still be dominant.  Russia provides about 50% of the organization’s budget 
and acts as the CSTO’s backbone, having the strongest military industrial complex and 
personnel reserve.  Just like the U.S. in NATO, Russia is expected to do the heavy lifting 
as a primary force provider.  While each country member has only one vote, CSTO 
spokesmen admit that Russia’s voice is most significant.  In addition, spokesmen point 
out that “all of the best personnel in the CSTO were trained in Moscow [and] some of the 
most powerful industrial weapons plants are on Russian territory.”256   Another benefit 
extended to CSTO members is discounted military equipment from Russia, a significant 
incentive for those dependent on Russian military hardware and spare parts for legacy 
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equipment.  The effort also has geopolitical consequences, making any integration with 
NATO, which usually involves extensive modernization, a costly alternative. 257 
In a June 2005 summit (held in conjunction with this year’s EEC summit) 
CSTO members signed agreements providing for the deployment of a unified air defense 
system and the establishment of rapid reaction forces in Central Asia that could be used 
for peacekeeping operations.258 The recent summit also announced plans to improve 
military-economic cooperation by promoting closer ties among member states’ defense 
industries.   In addition, Russia has offered financial incentives for active participation to 
include the sale of Russian military equipment to members at domestic versus export 
prices and eligibility of cadets and junior officers from the CSTO states for education in 
military academies, also at reduced prices.259  While such a move seems to be a clear 
attempt to counteract the influence of Western  programs such as  Partnership for Peace, 
it is also very pragmatic.  Offering discounted military hardware provides the Russian 
defense industry, dependent on exports for the capital necessary for modernization, with 
much needed revenue.  In addition, further integrating the CSTO officer corps into 
Russia’s military training process strengthens cultural ties between Russia and the 
members.  It also helps to institutionalize military doctrine compatible with Russian 
operational norms and standards.       
Expansion of the alliance has also not been ruled out.  Russia stated that 
the organization plans to “invite other countries to participate in CSTO activities as 
observers, and also foresees the admission of new members in the future.”260  The 
statement could have been alluding to the new Russian-Uzbek security pact that was 
announced in November 2005, a move that may signal Uzbekistan’s willingness to join 
the Russian led military alliance in the future.  Finally, President Putin used the summit 
to criticize the US-led anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan, characterizing it as "very 
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ineffective,” pointing out the renewed Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and the 
resumption of significant drug-trafficking.  Again, the statement was probably 
groundwork for the July 2005 request, made by the SCO, for the US to establish time 
frame for withdrawal from Central Asia, a move followed the next month by 
Uzbekistan’s six-month evacuation notice.  
Two years after its rebirth, Russia is considering the CSTO its most 
efficient organization in the CIS, largely because CSTO’s resolutions are binding on all 
members and have produced some tangible results. For example, the group’s annual 
“Channel” operations, joint coordinated anticrime actions conducted by all members, 
have met with success. According to the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, Channel 
2005 resulted in more than 11 metric tons of drugs, including 550 kilograms of heroin 
and more than one ton of hashish being confiscated, mostly on the Tajik-Afghan border, 
and 9,300 drug-related crimes being solved during this year's operation. 261    
The growing security concerns and common revolutionary phobia among 
leaders of the Central Asian states--spawned by events in Kyrgyzstan and more recently 
in Uzbekistan--only encourage greater multilateral and bilateral security cooperation with 
Russia.  Russia is sweetening the pot still further with its most recent financial incentive: 
discussions of providing Russian gas at discount prices to the most active CSTO 
members.  The organization is certainly becoming more vocal and more visible.  It is 
continuing to strengthen regional collective security forces and conduct more robust 
military exercises, two trends which will be discussed below.  In addition, the group 
appears to be reaching out for international validation, working with the UN on anti-
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terrorism measures and trying to establish cooperation with NATO.262  Most recently, the 
success of the Channel 2004 and 2005 anti-drug operations resulted in the U.S. signing 
on to observe Channel 2006.263   These efforts also represent Normalization efforts in 
that they attempt to create more transparency in security policy and foster increased 
cooperation with the West. 
b. Regional Collective Security Forces 
While the concept of joint rapid reaction forces is not a new development, 
it has recently grown in size and scope.  Under the aegis of the CIS Collective Security 
Treaty (CSTO predecessor) an agreement was signed in October 2000, to form a joint 
rapid reaction force: a “small compact group, consisting of four battalions contributed by 
the partner states” of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that would be used 
to respond to regional crises across Central Asia and to fortify porous border areas 
against terrorist attacks and incursions.264  While the initial Collective Rapid Reaction 
Force (CRRF or sometimes referred to as JRRF) consisted of approximately 1,500 
military personnel deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, it has grown in 
the last year to approximately 4,000 personnel and the number of battalions have 
increased from four to nine with Tajikistan contributing two new battalions and 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia one each.265  Another new element of the rapid 
reaction concept is planned development of a joint peacekeeping force that can be 
deployed within CIS territory (for example in Moldova or Georgia) or to other 
peacekeeping operations around the world.   A November 2005 meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers’ Council of the CSTO focused on the subject.  The group wanted to ensure that 
the organization’s 2006 budget would pay special attention to the topic, leading to 
speculation that since the Russian MOD vowed that Moscow would not move into the 
recently vacated K2 base in Uzbekistan, the installation could instead operate under the 
CSTO aegis. 266 These pledges have produced more successful military exercises among 
the members of the CSTO. 
c. Military Exercises 
Since the standup of CSTO and its dedicated headquarters staff at Russia’s 
Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, one of the most significant improvements that has been 
made is the greater integration and better training of forces. Prior to 2004, “Frontier” 
exercises designed to test regional collective security forces were mostly conducted by 
units and regiments of the national armies of the member-states which were assigned to a 
joint command for a short period of time.  Units permanently assigned to CSTO’s new 
Rapid Deployment Force  are already part of one organizational entity, which should 
contribute to more efficient and increased anti-terrorism capabilities.267  Improved 
training and integration of these forces were, evident in the Frontier 2004 exercise. The 
scenario for the 2004 exercise was the first that tested a pre-emptive strike concept, 
compared to previous years which focused on responsive and defensive operations. 
Specifically the 2004 was aimed at improving procedures to stop terrorist organizations' 
attempts to establish a radical Islamic state in the Ferghana valley. Military analyst JH 
Saat, of the British Ministry of Defense Conflict Studies Research Centre, provides an  
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excellent analysis of the exercise and the structure and effectiveness of the CSTO.  He 
observed that the Frontier 2003 scenario was based on real security concerns that the 
CSTO member-states face.  
The political-military situation in this region - and more specifically in 
Central Asia - is not very stable and there is a real possibility of the 
emergence of armed conflicts between the states in Central Asia and 
separatist movements. Furthermore, terrorist organizations remain active 
in the region and their training camps are still functioning. With this in 
mind exercise Rubezh-2004 [Frontier 2004] aimed at improving 
procedures to stop terrorist organizations' attempts to establish a radical 
Islamic state in the Ferghana valley, a highly undesirable development that 
would affect all states in the region. 268   
The Frontier 2005 exercise, held in April, was scheduled to be conducted 
in Kyrgyzstan but due to the unrest of the Tulip “revolution” was moved to Tajikistan.  It 
was also scripted (or perhaps re-scripted?) to reflect events similar to those that took 
place in Kyrgyzstan: namely that “Blue Forces” would use the popular unrest unleashed 
by the results of an election to try to seize power.  “Red Forces” would plan “to practice 
decision-taking measures on the use of force and options of collective security measures 
to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tajikistan, planning and preparation 
of joint operations, organization of coordination, provision of total support and 
directions.” 269   
As to the effectiveness of these exercises however in achieving their stated 
objectives, military and regional experts noted with interest that scenarios such as these, 
involving large scale and direct insurgencies on the part of terrorist organizations such as 
the IMU, have not been seen since the Batken incursions of 1999 and 2000.  Insurgent 
groups appear to be changing tactics from geographically large-scale actions to small 
injections of terrorist attacks across vast territory.270  If that is the case, the Frontier 
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exercise scenarios may not be an effective way of training to counter the Islamic 
insurgent threat (but may be effective for countering organized mass movements.)   
Regional integration efforts such as exercise and combined forces signal a 
newfound emphasis that common transnational threats and border defense need to be 
worked jointly, not just militarily but through cooperation with internal security services, 
joint intelligence databases and a strengthened joint anti-terrorism centers such as the one 
in Kyrgyzstan.  While the U.S. may have missed the boat on these opportunities, the 
Russians will likely be more successful at forging closer cooperation with local 
intelligence apparatus than the United States would have been anyway.  Despite the 
lingering issue of trust regarding Russian intentions, the intelligence apparatuses of 
Central Asian states share with Moscow a common heritage, operational style and 
training.  The main forum for intelligence cooperation is the annual conference hosted by 
the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), an event attended by 
representatives of all Central Asian internal security organizations.  In addition, Russian 
intelligence forces appear willing to assist locals in protecting regimes from political 
opposition forces – a service that would never by offered by the West.  Finally, Russia 
has been footing 50% of the cost of the joint anti-terrorism center in Bishkek and the 
center has been tasked with planning joint operations and holding anti-terrorism 
exercises.  Some success stories have apparently taken place in the area of joint 
intelligence efforts, including reports of Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
cooperating in an operation to block Middle East funds from getting to the Chechen 
rebels.  271  Efforts such as these are also indicative of Great Power Normalization in that 
they comprise of multilateral coordinated efforts to combat mutual security threats.. 
d. Bilateral Security Efforts 
In addition to standing up a dedicated rapid reaction force, Moscow has 
been reinforcing its military presence at two existing bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
and forging a new security alliance with Uzbekistan.   
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The foothold Russia gained supporting Dushanbe’s communist regime 
during the Tajik civil war has recently been formally translated into a permanent military 
presence.  With approximately 5000-7000 soldiers, the 201st Division’s headquarters in 
Tajikistan would be Russia’s largest military base on foreign soil. “Our military presence 
in Tajikistan will not only guarantee our investment but will also guarantee stability in 
the region,” Putin said after talks with Tajikistan President Rakhmonov.  272  Of interest 
is that formalization of the base came on the heels of the announcement of Russia’s $2B 
investment package and debt relief (discussed in the Economic section).   In addition, the 
fact that Russia is withdrawing its border guard forces (at least from border guard duty if 
not the country) and leaving this critical effort in the hands of weak Tajik security 
institutions, ensures that Dushanbe will continue to rely on Russian assistance in the 
absence of significant international assistance.   
With solidification of its presence in Tajikistan, and expansion of its air 
base in Kyrgyzstan to include CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force headquarters elements 
and the anti-terrorism center, Russia had its most significant bilateral success with the 
October 2005 announcement of an unprecedented security alliance with Uzbekistan.  
With bilateral agreements to participate in air defense and a successful first-ever bilateral 
military exercise  in September 2005, Uzbekistan, appears on its way to “becoming the 
Kremlin's full-blown strategic partner, now that it finds itself under severe pressure from 
the United States and the European Union.”273   
The process of rapprochement began in 2004, when Russia moved 
aggressively to develop stronger economic ties with Uzbekistan as noted in the economic 
section above.  In September 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan conducted their first joint 
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involved 200 Uzbek and 200 Russian troops with air support and artillery, and featured 
Special Forces conducting joint operations, practicing counter-terrorist tactics in village 
and mountain areas. 274   
The Russian-Uzbek security pact, formally referred to as the Treaty on 
Allied Relations, states that "in case of aggression against one of the parties by a third 
state, it will be viewed as an act of aggression against both countries."  The agreement 
also allows the mutual use of each other's military bases and installations and is largely 
seen as an insurance policy to limit Western attempts to weaken Karimov’s regime.275 
Upon signing the agreement, Karimov announced "I would say [Washington's] main goal 
is to discredit Uzbekistan's independent policy, disrupt peace and stability in the country, 
and make Uzbekistan obey." 276 
For Russia, the alliance with Uzbekistan is important since it reasserts 
Moscow's traditional influence in its "near abroad," and gives it the ability to limit U.S. 
and EU influence in Central Asia.  It also provides the Kremlin the opportunity to work 
on improving relations with other former republics in the region that have drifted toward 
the West.  While this may appear to be more characteristic of a Balancer foreign policy, it 
has Normalizer connotations as well.  In order to become the dominant influence in 
former Soviet republics, by definition Russia has to limit Western influence.  A Russian 
Great Power Balancing approach to Central Asia would result not just in efforts to close 
one base (K2) but close all.  As of early 2006 this has not taken place and neither Russia, 
not the SCO has attempted to alter the status of U.S. presence at Manas Air Base in 
Kyrgyzstan, although discussions concerning increased financial remuneration to 
Kyrgyzstan have occurred.  For Uzbekistan, the treaty provides a new security partner 
against terrorist threats, but more importantly, one that will not question Tashkent’s 
methods at suppressing anti-government sentiments. 
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Having successfully combined cultural, economic, political and military 
mechanisms of influence to turn its relationship with Uzbekistan around, can it be long 
before Russia persuades Tashkent to return fully to the fold and join the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well? 277     If it does, the former Soviet base at 
K2, occupied by U.S. troops following September 11,  2001, may soon be hosting a CIS 
peacekeeping contingent, bringing full circle the base’s colorful history. 278  Uzbekistan 
however, has been reserved on the issue of bases, announcing in February 2006 that it 
was not planning to join the CSTO in the near term, but leaving open the option of 
joining in the future.279   In the meantime, bilateral military cooperation will continue and 
possibly expand into the defense industrial sector with talk of a debt-for-assets swap, in 
which Russia would forgive Uzbekistan’s roughly $500 million debt in exchange for 
control over two strategic aircraft factories. 280  
D. CONCLUSION 
Russia appears to have been extremely successful in reasserting its influence in 
Central Asia and Uzbekistan, especially in light of the historically independent path that 
Tashkent has pursued in its foreign policy.  Russia has made use of the full complement 
of its diplomatic-political, informational-cultural, military and economic resources in 
Central Asia and made progress in strengthening each one.   
Diplomatically, Moscow has capitalized on the region’s fears that Western forces 
would try to undermine the government’s authoritative hold on power.  A political 
mechanism that Russia has been able to wield very effectively in Central Asia is 
promotion of the political status quo.  Russia’s success at tapping into the shared concern 
of political revolution enabled it to secure its newfound status among its Central Asian 
neighbors.  Nowhere has this approach been so successful as Uzbekistan, as demonstrated 
by Tashkent’s break with the West and subsequent alliance with Russia.  By taking a 
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position on the Andijon massacre that was so diametrically opposed to Western 
democratic values however, Russia could run the risk of alienating the constituency it 
needs to support its economic development.  Europe is still Russia’s number one trading 
partner and a major importer of its energy resources.  The perception of divergent values 
between Russia and the West could provoke a European backlash that would speed 
Europe’s efforts at energy diversification.   
In addition, Moscow has revived regional groupings like Eurasec and the CSTO 
that allow it the opportunity to significantly influence economic and security efforts in 
the region.  The utility and efficiency of past multilateral efforts under the aegis of the 
CIS are questionable, mainly because in most forums their resolutions were non-binding. 
However, multilateral efforts nevertheless mitigate Moscow’s heavy hand in the region.  
In today’s global environment of coalitions and inter-governmental organizations, Great 
Powers can gain more legitimacy with the appearance of regional consensus and 
cooperative multilateral engagement.  Nowhere is this more the norm than in military 
operations.    By couching its policy goals in the language of collection action, Moscow 
has sought to avoid the label of imperialism. 
In the information realm, a shared culture of Soviet bureaucratic and 
establishment ties gives Moscow an edge in dealing with the regional political and 
business elite.  Soviet habits still survive. "There's still a lot Soviet in us -- Soviet 
mentality, Soviet methods for reaching decisions," said Joomart Otorbayev, deputy prime 
minister of Kyrgyzstan. "The Soviet system of management that buried the Soviet Union 
is still with us -- and, unlike Moses, there was no chance to take everyone into the desert 
for 40 years to shed the slave's mentality." 281 
Militarily, the Kremlin has tapped into mutual concerns over Islamic 
fundamentalism and used its position as a regional military power to bolster security ties.  
The CSTO Secretary General explained the organization’s approach to making it 
attractive to members:   
You know, we not planning to try and persuade anyone to join the CSTO. There 
are some agreements within the CSTO and the states do have preferences which 
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they present to one another - preferential terms for military-technical cooperation, 
for example, free or concessionary staff training, military aid, assistance in 
enhancing the anti-terrorist and anti-drugs potential of the special forces of the 
states' law-enforcement agencies. There's a whole set of measures that I think are 
of great interest to states but I repeat, everything depends on the political line 
taken by the country, by a specific country. If it's interested in guaranteeing 
collective security from the point of view of being part of the CSTO, it'll say 
so.282 
Several components of the economic analysis of this case study are striking. First, 
the depth and breadth of Russia’s penetration of the energy market in Central Asia creates 
dependency on Russia; Russian efforts cover oil, natural gas and electricity, with each 
spearheaded by state-controlled monopoly firms. Second, the nature of Russia’s 
economic acquisitions in the region suggest that Russia seeks to take advantage of the 
weakness of the republics to help itself, relying on equity swaps of strategic infrastructure 
to clear the Central Asian republics debts with Russia. Third, these efforts seem to be 
linked to a great extent to political and military goals of force projection. Energy deals in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan each have resulted in a military quid pro quo for 
Moscow, be it fortification of its own security forces in the country or expulsion of a 
competitors.   
While there is nothing uncommon about powerful states creating these types of 
linkages in their foreign policy, the concern is motivation. A strategy of Great Power 
Normalization is characterized by bilateral and coalition-based agreements that are 
economically focused and mutually beneficial, based on shared expectations, positive 
returns and a level of transparency in transactions. Such efforts are consistent with  tenets 
of economic liberalization that Normalizers espouse and the foundation of maintaining 
cooperative relations with the West.   Some experts however, question whether all of the 
economic and integration initiatives introduced by Moscow really are mutually beneficial 
or do they  unfairly benefit Russia and promote its monopoly position in the region’s 
energy sector.  As Jerom Perovic noted, 
The creation of energy partnerships with the Central Asian states, which 
have been accompanied by an aggressive expansion of Russian energy 
companies into these markets is the clearest indication of Russia’s desire 
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to control the flow, and if possible, production of energy throughout the 
entire post-Soviet space. A major economic reason behind the creation of 
such partnerships is to reduce, or ideally eliminate, potential 
competition.283  
Moscow’s heart never seemed to be in the earlier economic integration efforts 
within the CIS, as its protectionist practices demonstrated.  In this regard, Russia’s efforts 
to revive regional integration projects or create new ones that focus on establishing 
common markets and free trade zones at first seem puzzling.  However, having seen the 
evidence of how an influx in Western capital (such as the BTC pipeline) can alter the 
geopolitical balance, Moscow may have realized that establishing such arrangements 
with Caspian Basin states would secure it preferential treatment over foreign companies 
trying to enter the same market.284  With regard to WTO accession, it is also in Russia’s 
interest to urge a coordinate approach to WTO membership.  Failure to do so could result 
in “substantial losses for Russia, if, once in the WTO, these countries demand an opening 
of Russia’s markets, as Kyrgyzstan [a WTO member] has already done.”285 
While Russia’s efforts to influence Central Asia through economic mechanisms 
meets the tenets of Great Power Normalization, it bears signs of neo-imperialism, a 
relationship characterized by a strong country trading territorial and political domination 
for economic domination and diplomatic influence.  Such efforts are used to perpetuate 
dependencies and asymmetric relationships with weaker states.  One must not assume 
however that just because they are smaller and have fewer resources that the Central 
Asian states are automatically vulnerable to Russian neo-imperialist advances. Under 
President Putin’s Great Power Normalization policy, Central Asian states have found 
they can receive “both economic and political benefits from cooperation with Russia by 
using Russia – and other external powers- as allies in their counterterrorism efforts and to 
stabilize their domestic power against Islamic opposition movements.”286     
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There are elements of Balancing behavior in the security aspects of Russia’s 
foreign policy in Central Asia, namely the expulsion of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan and 
the quid pro quo of fortifying Russia’s military presence in exchange for economic 
investment, Overall however, Moscow’s approach does resemble Normalization, 
particularly in its economically focused agenda and emphasis on multilateral approaches 
to regional security via the CSTO. .   
There are factors that naturally draw Russia and Central Asian states together and 
mitigate what appears as overly aggressive Russian initiatives. Politically and in terms of 
transportation infrastructure, Russia is more accessible than the lucrative markets of 
Europe and Asia, making trade less expensive than with other countries.  A shared 
“Soviet” mentality, particularly among the elite, makes commercial dealings easier.  
While the Caucasus share the same history, they also have a close “other” such as Turkey 
and Europe with which they can culturally identify.  For Central Asia, Europe is a 
continent too far. “Fearing domestic upheavals that would jeopardize their tenuous hold 
on power, regimes are reluctant to undertake the dramatic structural reforms necessary to 
make their economies more attractive to foreign investment” and their governments more 
acceptable to the West.287 None of the former Soviet republics was prepared for 
independence in 1991.  “The republics lacked the most basic tools of nationhood -- a 
banking system, for example, or a defense ministry, or a postal service.”288 In Central 
Asia, most republics even lacked an indigenous national identity and language.   
In this regard Russia was far better equipped to assume its independence. As the 
successor to the Soviet Union and tsarist Russia, it cannot seem to help acting like a “big 
brother” to its smaller neighbors.  While it does not want to assume financial 
responsibility for them, a “big brother” mentality makes it that much easier for Russia’s 
relations with the Central Asian states to begin assuming the trappings of a neo-imperial 
relationship.  Certainly the potential--if not yet the full-blown reality--for such a 
relationship exists in Central Asia.  




V. FINAL ANALYSIS - WHAT KIND OF REGIONAL HEGEMON 
IS RUSSIA STRIVING TO BE IN THE FORMER SOVIET 
UNION? 
Russian foreign policy has undergone a significant change in the last several 
years.  The year 2004 was a low point for Moscow.  The initial sense of a unity with the 
West following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States had 
evaporated and once again Russia was being criticized for its human rights violations in 
Chechnya and its retreat from democracy at home.  “Colored Revolutions” in Georgia 
and Ukraine seemed to repudiate the Soviet political order that still dominated many of 
the former Soviet states. The spark that had characterized President Bush and President 
Putin’s personal relationship was absent during their 2005 summit meeting in Bratislava.  
Then, the “inexorable rise in oil prices” seemed to give Russia a new lease on life. With 
the European Union’s troubling performance in the constitutional referendums and the 
United States preoccupied by Iraq and natural disasters at home, Moscow’s international 
standing strongly recovered.289  Scheduled to host the July 2006 summit of the G-8 
countries, and fresh off of geopolitical victories such as the expulsion of U.S. military 
forces from Uzbekistan and the subsequent security alliance between Tashkent and 
Moscow, Russia appears to have “finally left the Western orbit and set out in free 
flight."290   
What does this bode for Russia’s policy toward the former Soviet republics? Is 
Russia merely pursuing a pragmatic policy, normal for any regional great power? Is it 
motivated by a desire to countermand U.S. power at every turn, particularly through a 
neo-Soviet reintegration of the former Soviet Union? Andrei Tsygankov characterizes 
these options as either Great Power Normalization or Great Power Balancing. Russia’s 
behavior in the Caucasus and Central Asia most closely resembles a policy of Great 
Power Normalization. The pragmatic foreign policy model that President Putin advocates 
and Andrei Tsygankov describes as Great Power Normalization is based on three primary 
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tenets: a renewed focus on pragmatism and economic interests versus traditional security 
related ones; cooperative economic and security relations with the West; and revival of 
Russia’s historically dominant position of influence in the former Soviet republics.  The 
focus of this thesis was analysis of the third tenet in an effort to answer three related 
questions. 
A. WHAT ARE THE MECHANISMS RUSSIA HAS USED IN ITS EFFORTS 
TO REESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN THE FORMER SOVIET 
REPUBLICS?   
Analysis of this question was conducted using a framework that addressed 
Russia’s diplomatic, information/cultural, military and economic (DIME) efforts to gain 
influence in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.  The major 
findings for each region are summarized below.  
1. Georgia and the Caucasus 
Russia has fewer effective mechanisms of influence in Georgia than in most states 
of Central Asia, but what it has is potent.  Russia has lost ground in its ability to manifest 
its interests in Georgia and the Caucasus.  The attractiveness and utility of its cultural 
legacy is low and the region is increasingly looking westward to Turkey and the 
European Union.  The “Rose Revolution” has given Tbilisi much more visibility on the 
international scene, allowing it to look westward for political support and financial 
assistance as its relations with Russia grow increasingly strained. Politically, bilateral 
relations between Moscow and its neighbors in the Caucasus are stymied by the existence 
of internal conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and 
between Tbilisi and the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.   
While Georgia has successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Russia’s two 
remaining Soviet-era bases, Tbilisi cannot afford to become too emboldened in its efforts 
to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without Russian cooperation.  It 
has few options available for replacing the existing Russian-dominated peacekeeping 
forces in those regions.  Until such time as alternatives become available and a way out 
of the bilateral peace agreement that created the joint peacekeeping force is found, Russia 
will maintain a very significant lever of influence over Georgia.   
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Economically, while making significant inroads into Georgia’s energy 
infrastructure, Moscow’s economic leverages are threatened by the existence of the new 
BTC oil pipeline and the soon to be completed Shaw-Deniz gas pipeline – Western 
backed projects that will significantly free Georgia from its current reliance on Russian 
energy and provide much needed revenue from transit fees.     
2. Uzbekistan and Central Asia 
There can be no doubt that Russia is significantly increasing its influence in 
Central Asia through the successful implementation of numerous cultural, political, 
economic and military mechanisms.  The region’s political and business elite still share a 
cultural affinity with Russia. Moscow has very effectively played on the fears of the 
region’s authoritarian regimes with regard to their domestic stability.  Leaders such as 
Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov generally perceive that the U.S. presence in the region is 
temporary, whereas Russia is there “for good.”  It remains to be seen whether the 
renewed ties between Tashkent and Moscow represent more than just President 
Karimov’s knee-jerk reaction to Western criticism of his regime’s brutal crackdown in 
Andijon in May 2005.  On the surface the new Russian-Uzbek security treaty is 
unquestionably a diplomatic nod to Moscow, a reward for its political support and 
economic investment; however, President Karimov has proved to be a very pragmatic 
leader, who does not appear to be willing to play to anyone’s interests but his own.   
Most significant in this case study is the substantial depth and breadth of 
Moscow’s penetration of the region’s energy industry.  Russia has very successfully used 
economic leverage, such as debt for equity swaps and pipeline politics, to ensure the 
region’s continued dependence on Russia for modernization of its energy infrastructure 
and transportation of its raw materials to external energy markets.   
B. HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE MOSCOW’S EFFORTS IN INCREASING 
ITS INFLUENCE BEEN?   
To answer this question, Russia’s mechanisms of influence were evaluated 
against a set of criteria that Tsygankov argued differentiated Great Power Normalizers 
and Great Power Balancers in their methods of relating to their former Soviet republics.  
The criteria for Normalization predicted that Russia would: 
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• Not use the CIS organization as a vehicle for reintegration; instead Putin 
would replace it with “more flexible, issues-based coalitions” with 
informal mechanisms and bilateral negotiations of interests 
• Welcome limited military Western presence in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus 
• Place geo-economic interests over geopolitical interests 
Overall, Russian efforts generally meet Tsygankov’s criteria regarding integration and 
geo-economics, but not regarding Western military presence.   
Reinvigorated efforts at regional integration have characterized Russian policy in 
Central Asia, both in economics and the security sphere, with Eurasec/EEC organization 
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization playing leading roles.  The CSTO has 
produced some substantive successes, namely in the realm of anti-terrorism exercises and 
counter-drug operations. However, it remains to be seen whether these organizations will 
remain viable, actively multilateral forums or whether Moscow’s strategic interests will 
dominate their agendas.   
Russia has not demonstrated much willingness to tolerate U.S. military presence 
on its doorstep.  It attempted to match Western basing with introduction of its own 
military facilities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Russia’s role in orchestrating the 
eviction of coalition forces from Uzbekistan, and its attempts to counter the U.S. Caspian 
Guard operations with its own Caspian naval flotilla are further evidence of this trend.    
Regarding the final criteria, Russia has clearly made economic initiatives a major 
component of its foreign policy, particularly in Central Asia.  “The fusion of the Russian 
government, the large Russian oil and gas companies, the Russian electric power utilities, 
and the newly emergent Russian banking sector has created a forceful new dynamic in 
the Central Asian region.”291  Analysts point out that Russia would not have been able to 
“mount an efficient defense against the revolutionary forces [in Central Asia] if the rise 
of world oil prices had not massively increased the resource base available for its foreign 
policy.”292  
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It remains to be seen whether this economic offensive will remain viable in the 
long run.  Great Power Normalization is characterized by pragmatic decision making 
based on liberal economic models; if it is motivating Russian policy, then it should in 
theory reflect sound financial practices.  Critics point out however that state monopolies 
such as Rosneft and Gazprom both engage in non-transparent deals and carry enormous 
debt.293   If economic initiatives, such as the widespread purchase of energy assets, are a 
ruse for a political agenda, the cost could be significant and undermine Russia’s long-
term economic development.  As one analyst noted, “there are reasons that the Central 
Asia and Caucasus power enterprises have not attracted commercial investment. Taking 
over assets that have been passed over by commercial investors implies taking on the 
responsibility for low-producing or even loss-generating enterprises.”294  Such activity is 
indicative of Soviet economic models dominated by subsidies and inefficiencies for 
political benefit, policy more in line with Great Power Balancer thinking.  If the gamble 
pays off however, and Russia is able to modernize these assets and maximize their 
efficiency, it could be strategically placed to take advantage of the burgeoning energy 
markets in China, Afghanistan and South Asia.    
C. WHAT MOTIVATES RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET 
REPUBLICS?   
Does Russian policy reflect the tenets of Great Power Normalization, Great Power 
Balancing, or a third alternative, Liberal Imperialism, currently popular among the 
Russian political elite? If motivated by Tsygankov’s Great Power Normalization, 
Moscow’s behavior in the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central is simply 
that of a regional hegemon, characteristic of United States behavior with respect to Latin 
America.  What if Russian policy is not driven by pragmatism and economic 
considerations, but is characterized by efforts to re-integrate, with an emphasis on 
military and security relationships? Then Russian foreign policy seems to take its cure 
from Great Power Balancers, proponents of a foreign policy that seeks formal re-creation 
of the Soviet empire.                                                      
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Tsygankov argues that Russia has not manifested the “traditional” patterns of 
imperialism, namely where one country formally assumes control over another’s 
sovereignty through military force and subsequently imposes colonial economic and 
social subordination (the Soviet model).  While Moscow still uses a “sticks and carrots” 
approach to secure its own interests, those sticks no longer comprise of brute force but 
“informal diplomatic influences and soft power.”295  This definition however seems 
outdated in a post-Cold War and post-colonial era where the principle of national 
sovereignty is supreme and international organizations like the U.N. act as global 
policemen defending a code of global norms.  Instead, one must consider the possibility 
that Russia may be acting in a neo-imperialistic manner, pursuing a foreign policy in 
which a strong country trades in territorial and political domination for economic 
domination and diplomatic influence. In a neo-imperialist policy, major powers use 
economic and political means to perpetuate or extend their influence over weaker states 
in a way that undermines their sovereignty.      
Analysis of the case studies revealed that while military and security issues 
seemed to dominate Russia’s foreign policy in the Caucasus, economic mechanisms, 
specifically the energy sector, were most prominent in Central Asia.  This is where 
Russia has made its most forceful efforts at renewing a position of dominance.  
Tsygankov describes the projection of Russia’s economic power as “crucial for 
increasing Russian influence in Eurasia” and acknowledges that the Kremlin has 
“aggressively asserted control over the ex-republics’ strategic property and 
transportation.”  
Tsygankov’s model fails to recognize that these actions themselves could be 
perceived as too aggressive, or neo-imperial, by the West.  Other, less aggressive options 
for cooperative engagement exist, such as a potential Russia-Georgia oil pipeline from its 
port in the Black Sea down to Georgia’s hub on the BTC, but they are not acted upon.  
When Russia forgoes efforts such as these in favor of “corporate raiding” of former 
Soviet republics’ energy infrastructure, it raises legitimate concern in the West.   
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The repercussions of such behavior might threaten Russian President Putin’s 
attempts to maintain the economic and security cooperation with the West he claims is 
critical to Russia’s development as a Great Power.  The perception that Russia is 
pursuing a neo-imperialist policy, hijacking the energy infrastructure of weaker states that 
do not possess the capacity to modernize their energy sectors, could generate a regional 
and international backlash.  After January 2006, following Russia’s much publicized gas 
war with Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s energy politics has cast doubts among some 
critics as to whether Moscow should host the G-8 summit in July 2006, and whether it 
should even be a member of the international organization.296  While still affirming 
Russia’s G-8 membership, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice remarked that, “that 
kind of behavior is going to continue to draw comment about the distance between 
Russian behavior in something like this and what would be expected of a responsible 
member of the G8." 
Russia has so far downplayed accusations of heavy-handedness in its energy 
policies.  At a 31 January press conference President Putin dismissed the possibility that 
the country’s G-8 status could be re-evaluated, downplaying the significance of 
diplomatic rhetoric by telling the audience, "the dog barks, the caravan rolls on."297  
Accusations of neo-imperialism are also answered with accusations of a Western double 
standard. Anatol Lieven notes that Russians ask,  
Why castigate Moscow for working with dictatorships when Washington 
has long done the same thing, routinely accommodating any dictatorship 
possessed of sufficient oil? Why lecture Russia on the need to adopt 
‘universal market practices’ and then howl when it raises its prices for 
supplying energy to its neighbors to market levels? Why give huge 
amounts of U.S. aid to one Georgian leader after another just because they 
are anti-Russian, even after they become corrupt potentates?298   
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From a Russian perspective, its behavior is that of any normal great power. 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In light of Russia’s renewed presence in the former Soviet Union, the West should 
not disengage from the Caucasus or Central Asia.  It should however attempt to mitigate 
Russian perceptions of its actions in the region through greater engagement with Russia, 
solicitation of its cooperation in multilateral security and economic ventures, and 
transparency in any bilateral endeavors with the countries of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.  Russia in turn must reconcile its pragmatic foreign policy goals in the region with 
its zero-sum mentality concerning Western presence.  The two approaches are not 
compatible and lead to an incoherent and reactive foreign policy.  Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow emphasized this point during his tenure in 
Moscow. In 2004 he noted that, 
America's relations with the countries of the CIS do not represent a zero-
sum game, in which a gain for the United States represents a loss for 
Russia, or vice versa. The United States has no interest in crowding Russia 
out of areas in which it has historical interests. However, we do have an 
interest - an interest that we share with Russia - in promoting stability and 
prosperity among Russia's neighbors. The resolution of "frozen" conflicts 
in Georgia and Moldova, and encouraging economic and political reform 
in Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia, will help ensure that Russia's 
neighbors become stable and prosperous countries, rather than exporters of 
instability, crime and extremism. Failing to see this only sets back Russia's 
own development and hurts Russia's interests.299 
A weak Russia is not in the West’s best interest, but neither is a Russia that 
perpetuates weakness and stifles reform in the former Soviet republics for the sake of the 
political status quo.  If Moscow’s pragmatic “Normalization” foreign policy is its best 
chance of ensuring economic development and regional stability, then it would seem 
logical to encourage its neighbors to adopt some of its tenets, such as market-
liberalization and economic and security cooperation with the West.  This could be 
accomplished through trilateral ventures that allow Russia a substantive role. Both 
partners bring different strengths to the table; the West has more resources and technical 
expertise but Moscow has the experience of a shared business and political culture, as 
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well as an understanding of the operating environment, from infrastructure to finance. 
This would eliminate the need for states in Central Asia and the Caucasus to choose 
























A. BACKGROUND ON GEORGIAN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnic populations in autonomous oblasts 
that had historically chafed under Stalin’s perverse nationalities policy, now found 
themselves adrift in someone else’s homeland as 15 union republics became independent 
states.  Moscow, realizing that former Soviet bases would eventually have to be 
withdrawn from some of the new states (given the problematic nature of some of their 
relations), took advantage of several ethnic conflicts to formalize its continued military 
presence in these former republic as “peacekeepers” and guarantors of the status quo.  
For the Georgians this meant territorial integrity, for the separatists, ceasefires on 
favorable terms.  The West, observing the events of the early 1990s unfold was hesitant 
that interference would derail Russia’s nascent efforts to establish democracy and a 
market economy.  The international community, occupied with larger crises in states such 
as Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia were unable to garner much support 
for conflicts in Russia’s periphery.  The West recognized Russia’s unique role in the 
region and, cultivating its newfound political reconciliation with the Kremlin, largely left 
the management of these crises to Moscow. 300  
1. Background on South Ossetia Conflict 
Alarmed by Georgia’s increasingly nationalist rhetoric, ethnic Russians in South 
Ossetia unilaterally declared the district a “republic” in 1991, a move the Georgian 
parliament rejected and followed with revocation of the district’s “autonomous” status.  
Unable to secure their own liberty and hesitant to remain “guests” within Georgia, ethnic 
Russians in South Ossetia turned to Moscow for assistance.  Armed conflict began in late 
1991/early 1992, between Georgian paramilitary forces and Ossetian rebels considerably 
assisted by their Russian neighbors in North Ossetia, as well as former Soviet military 
forces stationed in the region.  Moscow used its local military forces to advance the cause 
of the rebels before calling for ceasefires and forging the peace on terms relatively 
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favorable to the separatists and Moscow.  A mixed peacekeeping force was deployed, 
consisting of approximately 1000 North Ossetian, Russian and Georgian troops. The 
original peacekeeping "mandate" agreed on between Georgia and Russia was for two 
months, but because political leaders were unable to reach an agreement concerning 
South Ossetia's status, it was extended indefinitely.301 The situation today remains no 
closer to a political settlement.   
2. Background on Abkhazia Conflict 
Likewise alarmed by resurgent Georgian nationalism, the Abkhaz minority in the 
former autonomous oblast of Abkhazia led the call for independence, which Georgia 
opposed militarily. Units of the Russian Army, quartered in Abkhazia, provided 
equipment and expertise to the Abkhazians, as well as support from the Russian Air 
Force. It is not clear whether they were acting independently or following orders from 
Moscow.  Russian veterans living in Abkhazia also provided their services, as did 
Russian Cossacks and mercenaries.   Breakdowns in several ceasefires and the civil war 
that followed contributed to the ability of rebels to consolidate their position and clear all 
Georgian forces from the region.  In addition, the majority Georgian population of the 
neighboring Gali region was driven from their homes and Gali subsequently became a 
buffer zone.  President Shevardnadze, desperate to contain the rising civil war, 
capitulated to pressure from Moscow and agreed to join the CIS and grant Russia basing 
rights in return for security assistance.  Russian military intervened to put down the 
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